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We propose a fundamental restructuring of the federal civil
pretrial process to address its great expense and unreliability in
resolving cases on their merits-problems largely attributable to
discovery. The proposed reforms establish an affirmative-disclosure
mandate that sharply reduces the role of discovery by transferring most
of the parties' burden of fully revealing discoverable matter, favorable
and unfavorable, to their pleadings. To effectuate the new function for
pleadings, the reformed process replaces Rules 12(b)(6), (c), and (f) with
pretrial merits review conducted exclusively pursuant to the procedures
and standards for summary judgment under Rule 56. Responding
parties will be required to fully disclose discoverable matter to which
they have exclusive or superior practical access ("asymmetric
information"), but only if the initiating party's pleading makes a
summary judgment-proof showing on all elements of their claims or
defenses that are unaffected by the information asymmetry. Discovery, if
any, would generally be deferred to the postpleading stage and restricted
to court-approved, targeted use as may be needed for purposes of
facilitating resolution of cases by summary judgment, settlement, or trial
preparation. Compared to the current regime, the reformed pretrial
process should enable courts and parties to resolve more cases on the
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merits-more cheaply, quickly, and reliably-thus increasing deterrence
and other social benefits from the use of civil liability to enforce the law.
Courts in this country, including "Mandatory Initial Discovery" pilot
projects, launched by the Federal Judicial Center last year, and abroad
are testing the benefits of affirmative-disclosure reforms that resemble
what we propose in this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
The principal function of the federal pretrial process for civil
cases is to create the record of relevant law and evidence that informs
judicial merits screening of claims and defenses and parties' decisions
regarding settlement versus trial.1 Indeed, the vast majority of cases
are formally or effectively resolved on the basis of these records or in
anticipation of what they will contain. 2 Currently, discovery plays the
central role of generating the pretrial record of legal and factual
information ("discoverable matter") needed to achieve these results. But
reliance on discovery to perform this task efficiently and reliably is
misplaced. By its nature, discovery entails a high probability of
producing incomplete and inaccurate pretrial records while taxing the
parties and public for the service with great and unnecessary expense,
delay, risk, and potential for litigation abuse.
In this Article, we propose fundamentally restructuring the
process for creating pretrial records to reduce the cost while increasing
the reliability of resolving cases on their merits. The proposal
1. Footnotes are limited to supplementing explanations in text and providing citations when
formally required or necessary to support our argument on contestable points. The following
definitions apply throughout, unless and until they are refined or replaced as needed in developing
our proposal. "Pretrial process" encompasses Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") 3-42, 56,
and 65, and "discovery" refers to the formal standards, methods, and procedure for parties to
compel disclosure of information from one another pursuant to Rules 26-37. "Discoverable matter"
refers to the general scope of discovery as substantively defined in Rule 26(b)(1) to include "any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense" and as specified in Rule
26(a)(1) regarding prediscovery required disclosures. "Pretrial record" comprises the sum and
substance of discoverable matter disclosed by the parties to one another and the court at any given
point in the pretrial process. "Rule 12 merits review" and "Rule 56 merits review" refer to the
judicial power to dismiss a claim or defense respectively under Rules 12(b)(6), (c), and (f) for failure
to allege sufficient legal and factual grounds for relief in the pleadings and under Rule 56(a) for
failure to show sufficient legal and evidentiary support in the pretrial record to warrant resolving
a factual issue by jury trial.
2. Pretrial merits review determines whether it is worthwhile to burden the parties and
public with the cost of resolving the case by discovery and ultimately by trial. Currently, such
preliminary merits screening occurs pursuant to Rules 12 and 56. Somewhat more amorphously,
courts make pretrial merits assessments pursuant to Rule 26(b) in regulating the scope, methods,
and intensity of discovery. The parties have the prerogative to settle (including to drop a claim or
defense) or press for trial at any point in the pretrial process. A relatively small fraction of cases
are tested and meet their end (though many "without prejudice" to refiling) on Rule 12 merits
review. Most cases terminate, including a significant fraction following some formal discovery, as
a result or in expectation of rulings on summary judgment motions under Rule 56 merits review.
Rule 26(b) decisions modulating the availability of discovery prompt parties to settle many cases,
dimming their prospects for succeeding at trial or even surviving summary judgment. Beyond
disposing of the great bulk of filed cases, most by settlement, the merits review, discovery burdens,
and other rigors of the pretrial process cast a shadow over unfiled cases, resolving an untold
number prefiling by settlement or default.
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establishes an affirmative-disclosure mandate designed to sharply
reduce the role of discovery, in essence by
* transferring the parties' burden of disclosing all discoverable
matter, favorable and unfavorable, from discovery to the
pleadings;
* eliminating Rule 12 merits review along with testing of
pleadings for factual "plausibility" under the "Twombly-
Iqbal rule"; 3
* testing the legal viability and evidentiary sufficiency of
claims and defenses exclusively pursuant to the standards
and procedures prescribed in Rule 56 for summary judgment;
* requiring parties to affirmatively and fully disclose in their
responsive pleadings (e.g., answer, reply) discoverable
matter to which they have exclusive or superior practical
access ("asymmetric information"), but only if the initiating
pleading (e.g., complaint, answer) makes a summary
judgment-proof showing regarding all elements of the
relevant claim or defense that are unaffected by the
information asymmetry; and
* restricting Rule 26 discovery, if any, to the postpleading
stage and then solely to court-authorized, targeted use as
may be needed for purposes of summary judgment,
settlement, or trial preparation.
Compared to the current regime, the reformed pretrial process
should enable courts and parties to resolve more cases on the merits-
more cheaply, quickly, and reliably-yielding increased deterrence and
other social benefits of employing civil liability to enforce the law.
Preliminarily, we provide an overview of the key components of
our proposal in light of the basic discovery problems they are designed
to address. A case example is presented to illustrate the workings and
effects of the reformed process compared to the current pretrial regime.
Having limited the purpose of this Article to introducing the design
concept and functions of our proposal, we will not undertake to
elaborate the operational details of the reformed process or empirically
assess its comparative advantages. We note that empirical perspective
on the proposal's potential benefits should emerge from ongoing
"Mandatory Initial Discovery" pilot projects, launched by the Federal
3. The "Twombly-Iqbal rule" refers to the Rule 12 merits review test derived from Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009), which authorize dismissal of any claim (and presumably any defense too) when its
"plausibility" is not shown by the factual allegations in the complaint (or answer).
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Judicial Center to evaluate an affirmative-disclosure mandate that
resembles, but was developed independently from, our proposal. 4
I. OVERVIEW OF NEED AND PLAN FOR REFORM
A. Problems with Discovery
Discovery empowers parties to extract secrets-crucially,
unfavorable information-from each other by means of adversarial
interrogation.5 This process, like other adversarial facets of the civil
liability system, is labor intensive, procedurally complex, and rife with
opportunities for dispute and tactical manipulation. These problems
with discovery are exacerbated by virtue of its nature as a game of
"hide-and-seek."
In discovery, the parties seeking information ("requesters")-
usually plaintiffs, as defendants typically possess the disproportionate
share of discoverable matter-must hunt around, often in the dark, for
clues to the whereabouts and content of the hidden or otherwise
practically unavailable information. Adversaries possessing the
discoverable matter ("responders") must disclose the information, but
only if and when tagged and pinned down by a requester's sufficiently
particularized request. Responders, however, need not-and in regards
to divulging damaging information, almost surely will not-be more
cooperative and forthcoming than absolutely necessary to answer the
specific request. Discovery never obliges parties to affirmatively fill
even critical information gaps, let alone to candidly and fully disclose,
without prior request, all the relevant evidence and legal authorities,
favorable and unfavorable, that they actually possess and otherwise
could obtain through reasonable investigation.
Under the best of circumstances, discovery proves a cumbersome
and drawn-out endeavor. But discovery's major obstacle to
accomplishing its information-disclosure objectives is its great expense
for the parties and courts. Discovery imposes high search, disclosure,
and oversight costs that deter parties and courts from pursuing
potentially fruitful efforts to enhance the reliability of pretrial records.6
4. For further discussion of Mandatory Initial Discovery pilot projects, see infra Conclusion.
5. Discovery is principally needed to secure access to privately held information that
damages the possessor's case. Parties have a natural incentive to volunteer favorable information,
formally or informally. Surprise use of favorable information at trial or otherwise is readily
addressed by barring admissibility or reliance on any evidence its proponent has not previously
disclosed. Hence, our primary concern throughout is disclosure of unfavorable discoverable matter.
6. Discovery is widely considered to be the most expensive-prohibitively so, in many
cases-phase of the pretrial process and, indeed, given the tiny fraction of cases that go to trial, of
2064 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:6:2059
These burdens are greatly magnified by the incentives that hide-
and-seek discovery creates for parties to behave wastefully and even
abusively. Thus, the parties are prone to overuse the process.
Frequently, this results simply because requesters must probe for
discoverable matter more or less blindly, without knowing the location,
identity, or even usefulness of requested documents, witness
statements, or other information. In fear of missing something useful,
requesters may resort to "dragnet" strategies, issuing requests
mechanically, indiscriminately, and in the sweeping terms of general
search warrants. Such broadly framed requests, especially when based
on nothing more than strategically crafted allegations in requesters'
"notice-plausibility" pleadings, will likely provoke broadly framed
objections from responders. Often, judges must intervene on the fly and,
based on little, if any, case-specific knowledge, decide how much (that
is, "proportional to the needs of the case"') of the requested discovery to
allow.8 Alternatively, responders may seek to avoid costly courtroom
battles by "dumping" the mass of requested documents on requesters,
civil litigation overall. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 & n.5 (2010) (estimating average expense of discovery
equal to roughly fifty percent of litigation costs and ranging as high as ninety percent in certain
types of litigation). Notably too, discovery is viewed as very often a waste of time and money. See,
e.g., Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 1658-61 (2016)
(citing and discussing studies as well as reactions gleaned from conversations with judicial
colleagues).
Recent survey responses by attorneys in relatively small-claim cases-that they often do not
use discovery, and when they do, the costs are roughly proportional to parties' stakes-prompted
the lead researchers to conclude that any discovery-cost problem is confined to large-scale/stakes,
complex litigation. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DuKE L.J. 765, 786 (2010) (explaining a study demonstrating "that
discovery and overall litigation costs were largely proportionate to stakes, and that the stakes in
a case were the single best predictor of overall costs"). This calming surmise is flawed. The study
never sought to determine whether prohibitive expense rather than lack of necessity caused the
parties to forego discovery. For the view that expense probably best explains most of these cases,
see Marrero, supra, at 1657-58. Relatedly, the study's results are skewed by virtue of recording
incurred, as opposed to expected, discovery expenses; in many cases, the parties-particularly
defendants-may elect to pay a high price in settlement rather than an even higher one in
discovery. See Cameron T. Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary Judgment, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 2117 (2018). That discovery expense is proportionate to stakes in most cases-a virtual
truism of litigation economics-tells us nothing about whether it is excessive for a given party or
collectively for both, let alone socially appropriate. And lawyers' views may not be the most reliable
source for judging the matter, given the correlation between their earnings and unnecessary
discovery expense, with defense lawyers charging hourly fees and plaintiffs' attorneys taking (pre-
expense-charge) percentages from settlements inflated by defendants' expected (possibly nuisance-
value) discovery costs.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
8. Judges are also prone to overestimate the burden on responding parties, particularly
business, government, and other institutional defendants in complex litigation. See infra Section
III.B.1 (discussing the Court's rationale of Twombly pleading as protecting defendants from
extortion).
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forcing them to comb the haystack of materials at great expense, often
in a futile search for a needle of useful information.
More generally, the parties' ability to consume discovery
benefits without paying its full costs distorts their decisions regarding
how and how much to use the process. Thus, requesters are encouraged
to cast their discovery nets more broadly than necessary because,
despite bearing the expense to prepare their requests and analyze the
responses, they do not (with certain important exceptions) pay for
responders' expenses to prepare responses. Similarly, responders will
be more inclined to adopt dumping and other costly antidisclosure
strategies because they pay only to prepare their responses but not
requesters' expenses to formulate requests and review disclosed
material. This problematic "subsidy" for discovery is amplified by the
parties' exemption from paying the costs that courts incur to supervise
the process.
Discovery's susceptibility to be overused and gamed by the
parties not only leads to wasteful litigation but also invites, if not
licenses, opportunistic adversarial tactics. Notably, parties can
threaten dragnet requests, dumping, or imposition of a myriad of other
discovery burdens to "extort" settlement concessions from each other.
Although trial judges are supposed to prevent parties from abusing as
well as overusing discovery, they generally lack information, resources,
and, all too often, inclination (especially when stiff sanctions are
needed) to do so effectively.
B. Reform Proposal
In essence, our proposal comprises a set of simple, interrelated,
and substantial changes in the role and scope of discovery and pleadings
and their relationship to pretrial judicial merits review. Driven by its
core mandate for the parties to affirmatively disclose all relevant
factual and legal information in their pleadings, the reformed process
addresses the basic problems with discovery that stem largely from its
hide-and-seek structure. The objective is to increase net social benefit
not solely by reducing the cost of producing pretrial records but by
enhancing their substantive reliability for courts and parties to better
assess case merits.
We summarize the principal components of the reformed
process: pleading report, summary judgment, and restricted discovery.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
1. Pleading Report
The keystone reform we propose is transferring the parties'
burden to disclose discoverable matter and create pretrial records from
discovery to the pleadings. In the reformed process, the parties'
pleadings must specifically and accurately present all relevant facts
(including but not limited to information that is or can be rendered
admissible in evidence) and law (inclusive of legal authorities, theories,
opinions, and arguments)-unfavorable as well as favorable. No longer
would pleadings merely convey allegations to provide notice of the
nature of claims and defenses and indicate their bare factual
plausibility, leaving discoverable-matter disclosures and pretrial record
creation to come later in the course of time-consuming, costly, and
chancy hide-and-seek discovery. To signify this change, the current
"pleading" designation for Rule 7 complaints, answers, and replies will
be revised to "pleading report."
Transferring the burden of disclosure from discovery to pleading
reports does more than alter the format and timing of party disclosures
to accelerate and reduce the costs of disclosing discoverable matter. The
change fundamentally alters the substance of parties' disclosure
obligations to enhance the reliability of pretrial records. The aim, in
short, is to end reliance on hide-and-seek discovery. The reformed
process will generate the needed information by unconditionally
mandating that the parties fully and accurately disclose all relevant
facts and law in their pleading reports affirmatively, without prior
request. Failure to comply will result in judicial sanctions, with no ifs,
ands, or buts about it.
Disclosure by merely alleging "facts" will not suffice. Pleading
reports must fully and accurately substantiate all contentions of fact
with all available evidence (defined by Rule 56 and otherwise) as well
as other types of discoverable matter. Such showings will typically
involve presenting the discoverable matter in attached affidavits,
expert reports, exhibits, legal memoranda and opinions, and documents
and other tangible materials (or, if convenience requires or permits,
descriptions of their nature, whereabouts, and content). This reformed
process requirement applies to all discoverable matter of which the
parties actually have and should, from prefiling investigation, have had
knowledge, possession, and control.
The pleading-report proposal also remedies problems of
asymmetric information that Twombly and Iqbal present. When a
party's pleading report specifically identifies and substantiates that a
responding party possesses exclusive or superior practical access to
[Vol. 71:6:20592066
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relevant information, the latter's pleading report must address that
information gap. Thus, the responding pleading report must reveal any
pertinent information that the party knows or, based on prefiling
investigation, should know, or specify and substantiate the cause of any
inability to do so (whether due to lack of knowledge, loss or destruction
of documents, unavailability of witnesses, unavailing investigation, or
otherwise).
2. Limiting Pretrial Merits Screening to Summary Judgment
Pretrial merits screening in the reformed process will be
available exclusively pursuant to the standards and procedures of Rule
56 summary judgment. This change follows directly from the reformed
role of pleadings as the primary medium for the parties to report all
discoverable matter that will compose the pretrial record. As such, the
resulting pretrial record should, at a minimum, provide sufficient
factual and legal support for the parties' respective claims and defenses
to survive a summary judgment challenge.
Because the scope, intensity, standards, and flexible availability
of Rule 56 merits screening comprehensively subsume and far outstrip
those of Rule 12 merits review, the proposal eliminates the latter as
superfluous. Removing Rule 12 merits review alone furthers the
efficiency goals of the reformed process. Criticized from the beginning
as unnecessary and readily abused,9 Rule 12 merits screening has
proven far more of a hindrance than help in resolving cases on their
merits. Typically, courts conduct surface, cursory, and, regarding
plausibility, impressionistic review, with virtually no pretrial record to
go on other than strategically crafted adversarial allegations.
Consequently, judges rarely dismiss cases without leave to amend the
deficient pleadings, save for the occasional, indiscriminate ouster of
those presenting information-asymmetry problems.10 Despite the
improbability of succeeding on a Rule 12 merits review motion to
dismiss,- responding parties may nonetheless find filing it worthwhile
to delay and otherwise burden the opposing parties' use of discovery.
9. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading and the Demurrer, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'Y 81, 82, 84-85 (1942) (observing that Rule 12 merits review, as compared to the common law
demurrer, was "not much more than a change of name," and like it, Rule 12 invites strategic delay
and, by contrast to summary judgment, limits courts to judging the validity of claims and defenses
"merely upon the formal averments").
10. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1246-48 (2013) (collecting empirical studies); William H.J.
Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPiRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 474, 482 (2017) (noting
increase in dismissal rate for antitrust cases after 2008).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
However, for purposes of promoting the goals of the reformed
process, the most important consequences of the proposed change flow
not from eliminating Rule 12 merits review but rather from subjecting
pleading reports to the rigorous testing procedures and standards of
summary judgment review. As applied to the reformed process, Rule 56
would authorize summary judgment directly on each pleading report,
in contrast to the current regime that defers review to the postdiscovery
stage. Thus, the parties could seek summary judgment on the whole
pretrial record as jointly created by their pleading reports. Movants
opting not to present evidence negating the sufficiency of or otherwise
respond to the nonmovant's case on a particular claim or defense (or
element thereof) could also, before filing a responsive pleading report,
press immediately for summary judgment on the opponent's pleading
report alone. This is not the "Twombly-Iqbal rule" in Rule 56 guise; the
reformed process conditions summary judgment on the movant
correcting material asymmetrical-information problems." Like a
Damoclean sword, the threat of summary judgment will discipline the
parties to conduct a thorough prefiling investigation at their own
expense and to fully and accurately disclose the evidentiary and legal
results in their pleading reports. Advancing Rule 56 review to the
pleading-report stage thus requires each pleading report or the jointly
created pretrial record as a whole, at minimum, to make a summary
judgment-proof case for claims and defenses on which the parties
respectively bear the burden of proof.12
3. Targeted Discovery After the Pleading-Report Stage
The third basic change concerns the deferred, restricted
availability of discovery at the close of the pleading-report stage. This
is a pivotal juncture in the reformed process. At this point, with
pleading reports having borne most of the burden of discoverable-
matter disclosure and pretrial record production, the parties can
essentially choose among three paths forward: submit their case for
11. For discussion of this critical condition on Rule 56 merits review, see infra Sections II.A-
B.
12. This is not to deny the persistence of party incentives to withhold disclosure of damaging
information even to the point of concealing it permanently. The reformed process, however, has
the comparative advantage over the current regime in motivating parties to fully disclose such
information. The key is that pretrial records composed of summary judgment-proof pleading
reports will provide potential party and judicial victims of abuse with far better quality and more
focused, timely, and efficiently produced information for detecting, sanctioning, and therefore
deterring misbehavior. The case for the superior enforcement capabilities of the reformed over the
current process is made infra Part Ill.
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merits review on summary judgment, (re)consider settlement, or
proceed directly to trial. Regardless of the course of action the parties
choose to pursue at this reformed-process crossroads, the court may
allow them to conduct Rule 26 discovery. The limits on scope, methods,
and intensity of discovery will be determined by the court and vary
according to its use in facilitating summary judgment, settlement, or
trial preparation.
Generally, the court would allow discovery sought in connection
with a pending motion for summary judgment only for policing purposes
of supplementing, verifying, and authenticating evidentiary and legal
information that was or should have been previously disclosed in a
pleading report to correct an asymmetric-information problem. Oral
deposition and other modes of discovery geared to trial preparation
would rarely be approved to facilitate Rule 56 merits review. Discovery
unrelated to initial and responsive-pleading-report disclosures may be
allowed only if the requesting party shows "specified reasons"; for
example, that existence of the information being sought is "newly
discovered"-essentially, that it was neither known nor, despite
diligent investigation, knowable prior to closure of the pleading-report
stage. 13 The court may broaden the scope and methods of discovery,
including use of oral deposition, when it would serve the purpose of
furthering either trial preparation (including after denial of summary
judgment) or settlement efforts pursuant to party stipulation.
In the event that courts learn from discovery (or otherwise) that
discoverable matter was not but should have been disclosed in a
pleading report, they will swiftly impose appropriately severe sanctions
on the delinquent party, including penalties for Rule 11 and Rule 37
violations, contempt, and professional misconduct. Moreover, the court
may, on its own or party motion, employ interrogatories, production
requests, and other discovery methods, as well as other means
(including use of special masters, independent investigators, and
experts) to police compliance with the affirmative, full-disclosure
mandate for pleading reports.
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(2).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
4. Case Example: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
Celotex usefully illustrates the workings and comparative
advantage of the reformed process relative to the present regime.15 In
Celotex, the wife of a deceased insulation installer sued Celotex,
claiming that her husband's workplace exposure to its asbestos product
caused his death.16 For present purposes, the chief issue in Celotex was
whether, given the absence of direct testimonial or documentary
evidence of such exposure, the plaintiffs showing of circumstantial
evidence was sufficient in form and substance to survive the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.' 7 The plaintiff seems to have had no
factual basis for alleging in her complaint that the decedent had been
exposed to a Celotex asbestos product. She subsequently acknowledged
this in seeking to excuse her ten-month delay in responding (but then
only in part) to the defendant's exposure-related interrogatories and
production requests on the need to search for such evidence.' 8 The
defendant's answer offered no help, apparently asserting a general
denial or lack of information regarding the alleged causal connection.
Thus, consistent with the current process's approach, the parties'
pleadings punted on the factual question of legally cognizable exposure,
leaving the matter entirely for development in discovery.
After a year of discovery efforts on the exposure issue, the record
consisted essentially of two pieces of relevant evidence. The plaintiff
supplied the first in the form of a letter from a construction-company
executive, stating that his firm had employed the decedent and
assigned him to train crews in applying the asbestos product Firebar,
14. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Celotex was among the trilogy of Supreme Court cases endorsing
broadened, rigorous Rule 56 merits review; equating the test for summary judgment with that for
Rule 50 directed verdict (now styled judgment as a matter of law) in a jury trial; and authorizing
its application without requiring movants to present evidence negating the case on which the
nonmovant has the burden of proof. Id. at 322-23.
15. Although Celotex headed directly to postdiscovery summary judgment, the benefits of
eliminating Rule 12 merits review are apparent from our comparison of how the case would have
been resolved using pleading reports directly reviewable under Rule 56 in the reformed process.
Id. at 319.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 319-20. Unfortunately, the Celotex record is not available online or, due to errant
acquisition and retention policies stemming from failure to appreciate the research value of case
records for academics as well as practitioners, in the Harvard Law School Library. David
Rosenberg has filled in some of the gaps in background information based on his study and practice
involving asbestos litigation. For description of the costs, including defendant abuses of the
discovery process in asbestos litigation, see David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of
Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1701-02 (1986) (book
review).
18. The plaintiff did not attribute the lack of prefiling investigation to time-bar pressures or
other such difficulties.
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and that although Celotex did not manufacture the Firebar in question,
it subsequently acquired the Firebar manufacturer. Celotex provided
the second piece of evidence, confirming that Firebar was purchased by
the decedent's employer during the period of his employment and that
the defendant subsequently acquired the Firebar manufacturer. 9
The district court twice-before and on remand after the U.S.
Supreme Court's review of the case-granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Finding the employer's letter irredeemable
hearsay, the court concluded that the record provided no basis for
believing the plaintiff could muster admissible evidence at trial to prove
the decedent's Firebar exposure. These rulings were reversed, in turn,
by the court of appeals, which in the last round held, with one judge
dissenting, that the plaintiffs showing of an "unbroken chain link [ing]
[the decedent] to Firebar, and Firebar to Celotex" was sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact for resolution at trial.20
Compared to the current regime, processing Celotex in the
reformed process would have resolved the case on the merits more
quickly and cheaply-and likely more reliably. Because the pleading-
report complaint must, at minimum, establish a summary judgment-
proof case of exposure-as to which there was no asymmetric-
information problem21-the plaintiff would be required not only to
conduct a thorough prefiling investigation at her own expense before,
not after, commencing suit but also to decide whether to press the claim
before, not after, discovery.
As indicated by the split in judicial opinion on the sufficiency of
the plaintiffs exposure evidence in the actual case, it is likely that the
defendant would regard pursuit of summary judgment worthwhile in
the reformed process. Although pleading-report disclosures would
probably hasten settlement of the case, even if the parties proceed to
summary judgment, the comparative cost effectiveness of using the
reformed process to produce the pretrial record should be evident.
19. Celotex also responded to the plaintiffs interrogatories that it might bear statutory
successorship liability.
20. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court of
appeals remanded the case for further proceedings in the district court on the defendant's denial
of successor liability, statutory or common law. Id.
21. Although the plaintiffs pleading report would specify Firebar sales records as an
asymmetric-information problem, the court might conclude that such information could merely
corroborate the employer's testimony. On this finding, essentially that the asymmetrically held
information did not create a "prejudicial gap" in the record for summary judgment purposes, the
defendant could proceed directly, without first supplying the sales information, to seek Rule 56
merits review of the sufficiency of exposure evidence in the plaintiffs pleading-report complaint.
The "prejudicial gap" precondition for obligating Rule 56 movants to correct an information
asymmetry is discussed infra Section II.A.2.
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Suppose the parties' litigation strategies remained as they were in the
actual case. Then the plaintiff would append the employer's letter to the
pleading-report complaint but, in contrast to the current regime, would
also disclose any unfavorable information obtained during prefiling
investigation, possibly indicating that the letter's author refused to sign
an affidavit or had personal knowledge only of the decedent's crew-
training duty, not his actual exposure to Firebar. And while the
defendant in the current regime could rely on the Rule 56 option
without presenting evidence negating exposure, in the reformed
process, the defendant not only would avoid discovery but also could
seek summary judgment on the pleading-report complaint alone and, in
the absence of any Rule 8 affirmative defenses, possibly even without
filing a pleading-report answer. 22
In advancing a proposal for comprehensively reforming
pleadings, discovery, and merits review to both cut cost and enhance
reliability, this Article contributes to the extensive and proliferating
literature on reform of the federal pretrial process. For the most part,
prior proposals preserve the basic structure of the process, aiming
primarily at curtailing discovery costs and, more recently, also
mitigating the arbitrary effects of the Twombly-Iqbal rule. Though
many are innovative, these proposals for reforming discovery follow
either of two conventional approaches: increasing judicial regulation of
its scope and methods or using fee shifting to correct party incentives. 23
22. The mandate for affirmative and full disclosure applies to Rule 8 affirmative defenses.
Hence, it will be necessary for responding parties to make a summary judgment-proof case in their
pleading-report answers on all elements of a defense unaffected by an information-asymmetry
problem as well as to present all discoverable matter regarding responses to factually and legally
substantiated contentions in the plaintiffs pleading-report complaint. Accordingly, if Celotex
raised a time-bar defense, as asbestos defendants routinely do, the defendant would conduct a self-
financed investigation based on the plaintiffs employment-exposure evidence and present all time-
bar-related discoverable matter, at minimum making a summary judgment-proof showing in its
pleading-report answer. Even with that delay, the reformed process would likely outpace the
handling of the question in the actual case, in which the pretrial record on the time-bar defense
required months of full-blown discovery to develop.
23. For important regulatory proposals for judges to sequence discovery based on the
probative value of information obtained in a prior stage, see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading
Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 883 (2010),
which suggests that judges stage discovery for claims that pass a thin plausibility test, with the
scope of inquiry determined sequentially based on the probative value of information acquired in
a prior stage; and Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 644-45 (1989),
which suggests that "[i]f pleadings were used to focus legal and factual disputes before discovery
began, or if discovery alternated with legal resolution, constantly paring away issues, the process
would be more tolerable." For inventive fee-shifting proposals, see Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey
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All, however, depend on the dubious assumptions that courts would
have adequate information and resources to make the regulatory and
fee-award decisions involved and that parties would avoid stirring up
unproductive, expensive satellite litigation. Notably overlooked as well
are the perverse incentives created by fee-shift solutions, motivating
responding parties to make it even more difficult and expensive to find
the hidden, damaging information. In any event, we emphasize that if
any such proposal were shown to be cost effective in promoting social
welfare, it could be readily incorporated in our restructured process.
We elaborate on the basic mechanics of the reformed pretrial
process in Part II. Comparison to the current process shows not only
the fundamental nature of the proposed changes but also, importantly,
that the reforms leave much of the principal norms of procedure and
practice unchanged. The reformed process undergoes a social-welfare
cost-benefit evaluation in Part III. In particular, we gauge the
comparative advantage of our proposal relative to the current-regime
baseline in determining which represents the better strategy for
minimizing the total social costs of creating pretrial records. By this
Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 449
(2013), which proposes that defendants be put to the choice: forego filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
and submit to the normal scope and extent of discovery, or file a motion and submit only to targeted
discovery, but if the motion is denied, pay the plaintiffs discovery-related attorney's fees and
expenses; Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 879 (2012), which advocates for allocation
of full discovery costs to the requesting party; and Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 855, 882-83 (2015), which proposes that lawyers prepare a budget for each phase of a
lawsuit, agree or object to the other side's budget, and present these to the court, which must either
approve the budgets or modify them based on a cost-benefit assessment. Proposals combining
aspects of both approaches can be found in Jonah B. Gelbach, Can Simple Mechanism Design
Results Be Used to Implement the Proportionality Standard in Discovery?, 172 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 200, 213-15 (2016), which suggests alternatives of a second-price auction,
posted prices, and a split-the-difference mechanism; and Andrew S. Pollis, Busting Up the Pretrial
Industry, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097, 2110-17 (2017), which argues that parties be required to
engage summary jury trials and that discovery should be managed through the appointment of
special masters.
For proposals more closely resembling ours, see Professor Donald Elliott's suggestion that
parties disclose all relevant documents (and other evidence) at the start of litigation, with
compulsory discovery available to any litigant who believes information has been withheld, subject
to bearing the responding party's fees if nothing is found. Easterbrook, supra, at 645-46. Professor
Elliott never developed or published the idea and recently rejected any movement toward "fact
pleading" as counterproductively inviting more and cleverer ways of alleging facts to defeat Rule
12 scrutiny and reintroducing code-era technical pleading disputes. See E. Donald Elliott,
Twombly in Context: Why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(B) Is Unconstitutional, 64 FLA. L. REV.
895, 905-06, 961-62 (2012); see also Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on
Twombly and Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 204-07 (proposing
application of summary judgment standards under Rule 12(b)(6) to screen the merits of antitrust
claims based on publicly available information and use of sequentially regulated discovery for
information within the defendant's exclusive control).
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test, the superior regime outperforms its rival by consuming less time
and money to produce the same or greater level of reliability. Obviously,
investing less time and money to produce greater reliability is
preferable, and as we show, that is the result the proposed reformed
process should achieve.
Analysis in Part III proceeds first from the assumption that the
parties (and their lawyers) will forthrightly disclose all discoverable
matter, including unfavorable information, as required by the current
and reformed regimes. Then, relaxing the assumption of party
compliance, we consider the reformed regime's relative cost
effectiveness in addressing three types of party opportunism: extortion
(using the threat of discovery costs to extract unmerited settlement
concessions); obstruction (burdening discovery to impede the
uncovering of damaging information, but ultimately willing to disclose
it); and concealment (preventing discovery by permanently hiding or
even destroying evidence).
Our central conclusion in Part III is that the reformed process
will outperform the current regime in controlling party opportunism, as
well as when parties forthrightly comply. The key point is that
compliance will be enforced pursuant to the general, unqualified full-
disclosure mandate, authorizing judicial sanctions for any subsequently
revealed failure by a party to disclose all relevant information in its
pleading report. No prior specific request or court order is required;
thus, no hide-and-seek excuses, dodges, or gaming will be tolerated.
Deploying Rule 56 in place of Rule 12 merits review enhances the
enforcement power of the mandate for affirmative, full disclosure of
discoverable matter by creating a pretrial record comprising summary
judgment-proof pleading reports that both removes the profit motive
for extortion and provides potential judicial and party victims of abuse
with information needed to better detect and deter obstructionism and
concealment.
Closing remarks in the Conclusion include a brief discussion of
some evidence indicating the functional viability and potential benefits
of our proposal for an affirmative, full-disclosure mandate. We note
similar mandates in use in some U.S. state and administrative courts
and in England, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy. We also point out
the particular relevance of the Federal Judicial Center pilot projects
underway in two district courts to test replacing Rule 26(a)(1) with
"Mandatory Initial Discovery." In the end, we suggest that the prospect
for any significant structural reform of the role and use of discovery
requires tamping down the profession's turbocharged adversarial ethos.
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Judges as well as lawyers must recognize that the parties' full
disclosure of discoverable matter is neither a contingent result nor a
dereliction of zealous advocacy but rather is the constitutive premise of
our adversarial system of adjudication.
II. BASIC REFORMS
Although the basic reforms are considered separately, they
compose a comprehensive and integrated process. Each part makes
possible and facilitates attainment of the objectives for the others;
indeed, none would make operational sense, let alone produce much
social benefit, standing alone. Moreover, all are intrinsically connected
to and motivated by the foundational principles and requirements of
the current process, the chief of which directs courts to apply the
procedural rules and exercise adjudicative and administrative powers
to maximize the chances for resolving cases on their merits. This
directive implicates the requirements of Rules 11 and 26 that the
parties accurately tailor and represent their factual and legal
contentions based on all relevant information-unfavorable as well as
favorable-that they actually and, from prior investigation, should
know, and to disclose such discoverable matter fully. 24
A. Pleading Report
1. General Scope of Affirmative-Disclosure Mandate
Pleading reports are the primary means for the parties to
disclose all discoverable matter and thereby create a pretrial record in
the reformed process. Pursuant to the affirmative, full-disclosure
mandate in the reformed process, pleading reports must reveal all
relevant legal and factual information that the parties actually and,
from prefiling investigation, should know. The pleading-report
mandate for full disclosure is coterminous with the substantive scope of
discoverable matter defined chiefly by Rule 26(b) as requiring parties
to reveal all nonprivileged information (regardless of admissibility in
evidence) relevant to their respective claims and defenses. Although
this mandate excludes materials that qualify for legal "work product"-
24. The basic reforms we propose, like the current regime provisions they replace, are
procedural defaults that the parties can change by agreement (with court approval as appropriate);
for example, opting to exchange discoverable matter informally rather than through pleading
reports.
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type protections under Rule 26(b)(3), it includes legal "opinion"-type
information discoverable under Rules 33(a)(2) and 36(a)(1)(A).
Further, the affirmative-disclosure mandate requires parties to
completely and accurately substantiate their legal and factual
contentions in the pleading reports, including with appended affidavits,
expert reports, legal memoranda, and copies or descriptions of the
sources, whereabouts, content, and availability of documents,
electronically stored information, witness statements, and other
discoverable matter. Privilege, relevance, or any other objection to
complying with this mandate must be stated with particularity in the
pleading reports, including specification of the nature of the
information at issue and substantiation of the grounds for withholding
or limiting its disclosure. Subjecting each pleading report to immediate
Rule 56 review buttresses judicial enforcement of the affirmative, full-
disclosure mandate, effectively requiring the parties to present a
summary judgment-proof case on the law and evidence.
To illustrate the sharp contrast between the full-disclosure
mandate for pleading reports and the bare-allegation, notice-pleading
paradigm in the current regime, consider a wrongful death case arising
from the collision of two cars at the traffic light-regulated intersection
of a local road and a busy, four-lane suburban highway. 25 The accident
occurred midday when both cars entered the intersection, with the
plaintiff driving west on the highway and the defendant crossing into
its westbound lanes, heading northward to continue traveling on the
local road. Consistent with the model for pleading negligence actions
provided by Form 9 (abrogated by Twombly-Iqbal), the plaintiffs
(federal diversity) complaint need only specify the location, date, and
time of the accident and then allege generally that the defendant
negligently drove into the car the plaintiff was driving, thereby causing
injury to her and the death of her husband, who was riding in the front
passenger seat. The defendant could answer in similarly minimalist
terms, responding generally on the particulars, denying negligence, and
asserting a defense of comparative negligence. Did the defendant run a
red light? Was he speeding? Did the plaintiff fail to keep a reasonable
lookout for cars in her path or neglect a reasonable opportunity to avoid
the accident? Under the traffic code, which driver had the right-of-way?
These and a number of other questions of law as well as fact would
25. This example is loosely drawn from news reports of a recent highway accident involving
tennis champion Venus Williams. See, e.g., Matt Stevens, Venus Williams Lawfully Entered
Intersection Before Crash, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/
07/sports/tennis/venus-williams-evidence-fatal-crash.html [https://perma.cclP24K-9E95].
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likely remain unanswered for months and possibly years, pending the
parties' completion of the costly discovery process.
In the reformed process, by comparison, the answers to these
questions would be "discovered" in the course of the parties' self-
financed prefiling investigation and disclosed upon filing of their
pleading reports. The parties would thus directly and immediately
create the pretrial record, composed of such discovery matter as their
affidavits; witness statements; police, insurance-adjuster, and expert
reports; and memoranda of legal authorities and opinions. The pretrial
record would reveal crucial evidence indicating that both cars entered
the intersection on green lights (the plaintiffs, just after the light
turned green; the defendant's, just before it turned yellow); that the
defendant was momentarily delayed in crossing the eastbound lanes
when an unidentified driver of an oncoming car illegally turned left in
front of him; and, significantly, that each driver's view of the other
entering the intersection may have been partially blocked by cars
standing in a left-turn-only lane on the westbound side of the highway,
waiting for a green-arrow signal. Regarding the legal import of these
facts, the pleading reports would present authorities and arguments;
for example, concerning possible traffic-code violations by the drivers
and related negligence per se import, and the effect of third-party
negligence on the defendant's liability for damages. By the close of the
pleading-report stage-at the latest-without need for formal
discovery, the case would be set for final resolution on the merits by
summary judgment; possibly after court-approved depositions, by trial;
or, if not earlier, by settlement.
Nothing comparable to this full, affirmative-disclosure mandate
for pleading reports exists in the current regime. The closest
approximation comes from the mandatory-disclosure requirements
under Rule 26(a)(1). Broadly framed, this provision directs the parties
to identify, without request from another party or court order, any
individual with knowledge of "discoverable information" and "the
subjects of that information," and further to produce or describe, by
category and location, all discoverable records they possess or over
which they have custody or control.26 However, by contrast to the
affirmative mandate for immediate, full disclosure of all discoverable
matter in pleading reports, the parties' Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure
obligations are subject to substantial delays in taking effect. Most
telling, they compel disclosure only of information the parties would
regard as the most favorable-and would in all probability disclose
26. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1).
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voluntarily-namely, sources and records that they "may use to
support" their respective claims and defenses at trial. 2 7
2. Mandate to Correct Information Asymmetries
Information-asymmetry problems pervade civil litigation. These
problems arise when one party (the "controlling party") has exclusive or
superior practical access to relevant information. Typically, this
information involves damaging evidence regarding the controlling
party's internal or otherwise "private" activities, policies, practices,
purposes, knowledge, or state of mind. Disclosure of such discoverable
matter is often critical, frequently determining the fate of the opposing
party's claim or defense.
Currently, discovery provides the only means for compelling
disclosure of such privately held information. However, on top of the
general impediments to effective discovery previously discussed, the
Supreme Court's Twombly-Iqbal rule restricts use of discovery to
prevent information asymmetries from precluding adjudication of
potentially meritorious cases. Operating as a catch-22, the Twombly-
Iqbal rule bars such corrective discovery unless the party needing the
information can pass the plausibility test and overcome the controlling
party's Rule 12 dismissal motion by specifically pleading the very facts
that the pleader cannot know and access without discovery. Hence,
Twombly-Iqbal perversely compounds the responding party's natural
incentive to make nonprivileged, damaging information hard to find in
discovery. For it is one thing to invest in deep-sixing, damaging
information when the payoff is merely lowering the adversary's chance
of finding it in hide-and-seek discovery and corresponding settlement
demand. But it is quite another given the Twombly-Iqbal reward:
preemptive Rule 12 dismissal of the opposing case without discovery.
Indeed, its perverse incentives are magnified; the more damaging the
information, the more the responding party will spend to hide it from
public view, even to the point of risking sanctions for destroying the
evidence.
The reformed process corrects asymmetric-information
problems by requiring controlling parties to affirmatively disclose the
privately held discoverable matter and, relatedly, by eliminating the
Twombly-Iqbal rule. Thus, when a party's initiating pleading report
establishes warrant for the adversary to correct an asymmetric-
27. Id. Similarly, Rule 26(a)(2) limits required disclosures relating to experts to the names
and opinions of those a party may call on its behalf at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
2078 [Vol. 71:6:2059
2018] PLAN TO REFORM FEDERAL PRETRIAL PROCESS 2079
information problem, the latter must disclose the discoverable matter
in question or explain and substantiate the inability or refusal to
comply. To create this obligation for corrective disclosure, the initiating
pleading report must specify the nature and relevance of the missing
information, state the purpose for its disclosure, and substantiate its
inaccessibility. In accord with Rule 11 requirements for alleging facts
on "information and belief," the showing of inaccessibility must present
a reasonable basis in fact for believing that the responding party
possesses exclusive or superior practical access to discoverable matter
supporting the initiating party's case.28 If the responding party fails to
file an adequately responsive pleading report, the court can order a
more completely investigated or substantively forthcoming response,
authorize the initiating party to conduct targeted discovery and tax the
responder with the attorney's fees and costs, or deem the responder to
have admitted the facts at issue.
Eliciting corrective disclosures would not necessarily require the
costs of formal process and sanctions. Unless and until the corrective
disclosures are made, the responding party would be precluded from
seeking judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56 (or at trial under
Rule 50) based on a "prejudicial gap" in the pretrial record that results
from the information asymmetries involved. 29 For purposes of
28. Rule 11(b)(3) provides the appropriate standard for triggering the responding party's
corrective-disclosure obligations. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3); see, e.g., Carroll v. Morrison Hotel Corp.,
149 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1945) (noting Rule 11's authorization of "information and belief'
allegations to address information-asymmetry problems). This showing need only indicate the
asymmetrically held information by generic type or category, with the corresponding breadth of
the corrective-disclosure obligation varying according to the nature of the material question of law
or fact involved. We illustrate this condition infra note 54 in applying the corrective-disclosure
mandate to Twombly and Iqbal. Pleading reports will not be restricted to saying simply "produce
all damaging information." They can employ "including but not limited" particularizations of
information. The initiating pleading report can also satisfy this requirement by adopting the style,
if not form, of a Rule 33 interrogatory or Rule 36 admission request, postulating the nature and
existence of the asymmetrically held information that must be disclosed. For example, the
initiating pleading report might posit that if the responding party denies liability, the responding
pleading report should disclose the contents and sources of information, which were or will be
consulted in the process of investigating and forming that contention, including but not limited to
specified particulars, and further describe the scope and methods of investigation, and the persons
who conducted it. Such particularization does not compromise enforcement of the affirmative-
disclosure mandate. The mandate's general injunction remains in full force and effect, authorizing
judicial sanctions for any subsequently discovered failure by a party to disclose all relevant
information forthwith, regardless of prior specific party request or court order.
29. This bar would not apply to impeachment, credibility, corroboration, or evidentiary
weight of asymmetrically held discoverable matter related to trial preparation or otherwise
normally beyond the scope of summary judgment review. Except for discoverable matter relating
to impeachment, however, responding parties would generally be required to disclose information
relating to trial preparation in their pleading reports or, if deferred by the court to the post-
pleading-report stage, in response to its targeted discovery orders.
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determining whether a "prejudicial gap" exists to block summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law in a jury trial, courts would
apply Rule 56(d), requiring the nonmovant to show that the missing,
asymmetrically held discoverable matter is "essential to justify its
opposition."30 Moreover, the responding party would be precluded from
asserting an affirmative defense that implicated any uncorrected
asymmetric-information problem. Similarly, it could not argue to the
fact finder that the adversary's case failed to satisfy its burden of proof
for lack of (previously undisclosed) asymmetrically held information.
The reformed process thus avoids the detrimental consequences
of the Twombly-Iqbal rule while more effectively promoting its salutary
aims. It salvages potentially meritorious cases by compelling the
controlling party to disclose the relevant information needed to fill a
prejudicial gap in the record under summary judgment review (or at
trial) or to facilitate trial preparation. At the same time, the reformed
process better achieves the Twombly-Iqbal goal of reducing the
discovery subsidy. As explained below, mandating affirmative, full
disclosure of discoverable matter in pleading reports and subjecting
each directly to Rule 56 merits review pressures parties to seek and
obtain all (nonasymmetrically held) information through their own self-
financed prefiling investigation, rather than foist the expense of
supplying it on the opposing party.
3. Judicial Management of Pleading-Report Stage
Courts would manage exchange of discoverable matter in
pleading reports much as they currently do in overseeing bifurcated
pleading and discovery. Thus, the court would set and adjust the ground
rules in a Rule 16 conference. During or before the conference, the court
would also rule on party motions relating to the extent and mode of
their own or opponent's compliance with the disclosure mandate, such
as seeking a more definite statement, striking objectionable matter, or
compelling or preventing public disclosure of certain information.
Although elimination of costly, hide-and-seek discovery obviates
the rationale for using the highly problematic Rule 26(b)(1)
"proportionality" constraint on the scope of discoverable matter, courts
in the reformed process would consider the listed and other factors and
circumstances relating to questions of undue burden and expense. An
example would be deciding whether immediate production of copies of
30. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(d). Nonmovants will usually encounter little difficulty in satisfying this
requirement as movants effectively bear the burden to delineate and establish the "essential"
relevance of the missing evidence.
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a mass of records, rather than an itemized description, would impose
unnecessary costs on either the responding or receiving party.
Regarding disputes relating to the obligation to disclose asymmetric
information, the court would determine whether the initiating pleading
report meets the burden of establishing the existence of the problem;
namely, by showing that the evidence is relevant and, in terms of Rule
26(b)(1), "the parties' relative access" 31 to it. These disputes may raise
further questions about the adequacy of the responding pleading
report's disclosures (or explanation for nondisclosure), such as the
sufficiency of the prefiling investigation of persons, records, and other
sources of information or of affidavit accounts of the substantive content
of business records or the affiant's state of mind.
Elimination of Rule 12 merits review would also leave intact the
court's authority to adjudicate subject matter and personal jurisdiction
and other Rule 12(b) nonsubstantive defenses on a priority basis. To
further reduce the chance of parties and courts wasting time and money
litigating the merits of cases that may be dismissed or substantially
reorganized on such nonsubstantive grounds, courts could extend
deadlines for filing responsive pleading reports, except when necessary
to preserve evidence or to develop an evidentiary record relating to a
particular defense.
Relatedly, courts could advance Rule 56 merits review of certain
substantive questions of law (including law applied to facts and legal
theories applied to law or fact) when it would achieve efficiencies
without predetermining other issues. Courts could also suspend, to
some extent, the parties' obligations to file complete, fully substantiated
pleading reports. For example, in many complex cases, resolving the
legal validity of a claim or defense on an expedited basis could save the
parties (and court) unnecessary expense regarding development of
expert evidence in their pleading reports and undergoing a Daubert
examination of its admissibility. 32
Preserving judicial discretion under Rule 56 to both advance
Rule 56 review of certain substantive issues and to augment the record
for adjudication of newly raised legal or evidentiary issueS 33 restores a
Conley-pleading benefit that was lost with the adoption of the Twombly-
Iqbal rule. In allowing more or less hypothetical fact pleading, Conley
enabled parties to avoid unnecessary development of their case before
31. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
33. The Rules 56(d) and 60 criteria governing the conditions for recognizing a newly raised
issue and augmenting the record accordingly are discussed supra notes 11, 29 and accompanying
text and infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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gaining the court's guidance during Rule 12 merits review and Rule 16
conferences on the relative legal viability of differing approaches.
Conley pleading, however, invited gaming, trigger-happy litigation, and
"amateur hour" case preparation. The reformed process remedies these
problems not only by its strictures on courts advancing severable
questions or accepting newly raised questions for Rule 56 merits review
but also by the practical necessity for parties to make summary
judgment-proof showings in their pleading reports.
B. Rule 56 Merits Review
1. General Scope and Advantage
In the reformed process, Rule 56 summary judgment standards
and procedure will provide the sole means for the parties to seek
pretrial merits review of the claims and defenses in their respective
pleading reports. The reformed process promises significant cost
savings by eliminating Rule 12 merits review as well as the current
discovery condition on the availability of summary judgment.
Thus, by the close of the pleading-report stage at the latest, a
case should be ready for Rule 56 merits review to determine whether
the pretrial record sustains the trial worthiness of a claim or defense,
or warrants its dismissal by judgment as a matter of law. But summary
judgment may be invoked on an expedited basis even before the
pleading-report stage closes. In the reformed process, a party can
institute Rule 56 merits review to test the legal and/or evidentiary
sufficiency of the opposing case based solely on the opponent's pleading
report. In short, as explained more fully below, each party's pleading
report must establish a summary judgment-proof case.34
This fast-track procedure resembles that currently provided by
Rules 12(b)(6), (c), and (f) merits review for testing the legal validity of
claims and defenses. However, Rule 12 operates under structural
constraints that render it inferior to Rule 56 merits screening of
pleading reports in the reformed process. First of all, Rules 12(b)(6) and
(f) thwart the objective of issuing final judgments as a matter of law in
that these provisions do not require the pleadings to provide any, let
alone a complete and accurate, evidentiary showing. Nor do they
require the pleadings to disclose discoverable matter relating to the law,
legal theories, or opinions of law applied to the evidence. To avoid
dismissal as a matter of law, the party's pleading need only notify the
34. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
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opposing party and show the court that a legally cognizable claim or
defense, broadly stated to include any nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or revising existing law, can plausibly be found
or inferred from among the pleader's self-serving, unsubstantiated,
strategically selected and crafted factual allegations and legal
conclusions. 35 Conducting "facial" review of such pleading contrivances
under Rules 12(b)(6) and (f) operates more as a sieve than a screen,
offering the form, but not substance, of accelerated testing of the legal
validity of claims and defenses.
The closest Rule 12 comes to affording the parties an effective
means for expediting legal-validity testing is subsection (c), providing
for judgment on the pleadings-meaning judgment after the pleading
stage is closed.36 To be sure, in the absence of a requirement to provide
evidence, let alone to satisfy the full-disclosure mandate, the pleadings
in many cases may not take great effort to produce. At the same time,
they will not provide anything approximating a reliable evidentiary
basis that the court would have under Rule 56 to resolve the case by
final judgment as a matter of law. 37 In any event, as discussed below,
fast-tracked judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56 in the reformed
process provides at least the same accelerated adjudication of questions
of law as Rule 12(c) yet does so on a more complete and reliable
evidentiary record.
2. Summary Judgment-Proof Pleading Reports
If the mandate for full disclosure of discoverable matter in
pleading reports provides the principal vehicle for building pretrial
records more reliably, quickly, and cheaply, then immediately
subjecting each report to summary judgment review based solely on its
legal and evidentiary showing is aptly described as the main engine
propelling the process. Given the decisive payoff of avoiding the costs of
filing a responsive pleading report, responding parties should rarely
miss the opportunity to have the case against them ousted on final
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56. This credible threat of Rule
56 review will make filing summary judgment-proof pleading reports a
practical necessity in most cases.
The necessity for initiating parties to file summary judgment-
proof pleading reports requires clarification in light of the mandate for
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b), (f).
36. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
37. Reliable evidentiary records are particularly important when the resulting judgment may
have spillover precedential or other significant social-welfare effects.
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responding parties to correct information asymmetries and its effect on
the availability of Rule 56 merits review. In particular, the previously
noted requirement that responding parties correct prejudicial
asymmetric-information gaps would be element specific. In other words,
the bar on Rule 56 merits review would apply only to an element
affected by a prejudicial gap created by the information asymmetry. The
initial pleading report must, of necessity, make a summary judgment-
proof showing for any elements unaffected by such a prejudicial gap;
failure to do so would render the claim or defense involved immediately
subject to dismissal on final judgment as a matter of law
notwithstanding the existence of a prejudicial gap in the record on some
other element.
For example, investors' federal securities fraud actions often
involve questions of evidentiary sufficiency regarding two principal
elements: materiality and scienter. 38 Sufficient evidence to survive Rule
56 merits review is often publicly available for materiality; that is,
whether the defendant's fraudulent statements actually-or, put
counterfactually, whether disclosing the truth would have-affected the
reasonable investor's trading decisions. However, because scienter
turns on proof of the defendant's intent to defraud the market, it is
likely that asymmetrically held discoverable matter will create a
prejudicial gap in the summary judgment record on that element.
Despite the existence of this prejudicial gap on the scienter element, the
defendant could immediately challenge the evidentiary sufficiency of
the plaintiffs case on the materiality element, and assuming this
showing is unaffected by an information-asymmetry problem, the court
can proceed to rule on the motion. 39 If, however, the plaintiffs pleading-
report complaint presented public-domain evidence sufficient to
establish a summary judgment-proof case of materiality, then the
defendant would be forced to choose between disclosing the
asymmetrically held discoverable matter to fill the prejudicial gap in
38. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 30-31 (2011) (finding
plaintiffs in securities fraud action sufficiently alleged facts of materiality and scienter).
39. Even if this element was affected by an information-asymmetry problem, the defendant
could still obtain summary judgment on the plaintiffs legal theory of materiality. Thus, had
Matrixx been presented under Rule 56 in the reformed process, the court could decide, as the
Supreme Court did under Rule 12(f), whether the defendant's statements constituted a material
misrepresentation in omitting reference to adverse, but not statistically significant, event reports
regarding its leading pharmaceutical product. Id.
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the record on the scienter element and forfeiting its right to move for
summary judgment on that element. 40
By subjecting each pleading report separately and immediately
to summary judgment review, the reformed process achieves better
screening of case merits as well as greater record-production efficiencies
than the current regime. As noted above, the parties will be compelled
to develop summary judgment-proof pleading reports based largely on
discoverable matter they generate in the course of their independent,
self-financed prefiling investigations. Moreover, requiring pleading
reports to be summary judgment proof will avoid the costs the parties
and courts currently incur for initiating, responding to, and conducting
discovery in unmeritorious cases.
C. Restricted Discovery
The reformed process promises to significantly lower and, in
many cases, eliminate discovery costs by transferring the parties'
burden of disclosing discoverable matter to the pleading reports and
restricting any residual discovery to court-approved, targeted use in the
post-pleading-report stage. Driven by the affirmative, full-disclosure
mandate, the parties' pleading reports will reveal all manner of
unfavorable as well as favorable discoverable matter-including a
particularized and accurately substantiated summary judgment-proof
showing of law and evidence for their respective claims and defenses.
Notably, courts and parties will assess and address the need for
residual discovery, well-informed and substantively focused by the legal
and factual record created by summary judgment-proof pleading
reports.
Any residual need for discovery will vary with the parties'
litigation choices at the procedural crossroads that arises upon closure
of the pleading-report stage. In essence, the parties can choose to
proceed along one of three direct pathways to resolving the case on the
merits: (1) summary judgment review under Rule 56, (2) trial, or (3)
settlement. 41 We briefly describe the scope of court-approved discovery
available depending on the parties' choice of how to proceed, beginning
with its most important use for present purposes in facilitating
summary judgment.
40. The defendant would still have to correct the information asymmetry in its pleading-
report answer, and the failure to do so would bar the defendant from litigating the scienter
question at trial.
41. The choice to settle or go to trial with related discovery options is also available following
denial of a motion for summary judgment.
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Summary Judgment. The evidentiary record created by pleading
reports constitutes the basis for summary judgment review in the
reformed process. Generally, there should be no need for the parties to
augment that record through discovery. However, the court may order
targeted discovery on a showing of good cause to supplement or police
the completeness and accuracy of the pretrial record for purposes of
Rule 56 merits review. The prerequisite showing of "good cause"
represents a demanding threshold such that courts are expected to
rarely approve party-directed discovery. Putting aside discovery for
policing purposes, good cause entails a twofold showing. The first, as
previously discussed, is that the missing evidence constitutes
asymmetrically held discoverable matter that creates a prejudicial gap
in the pretrial record. The second is that the specified gap in the pretrial
record was not known or knowable, despite the exercise of due diligence,
prior to commencement of the summary judgment proceedings.
Normally, such defects will be apparent from the responsive pleading
report, and the initiating party would seek an order from the court
compelling the filing of a supplemental pleading report. 42 Occasionally,
however, a new issue will be raised by the parties or court during the
summary judgment proceedings. 43
Trial. If the parties elect to proceed directly to trial, the court
will likely approve their requests to conduct discovery for purposes of
trial preparation. This will usually include oral depositions as well as
interrogatories and requests for document production and admissions
to corroborate, impeach, or generally appraise how witness accounts
and credibility will fare at trial. The court also may allow discovery to
supplement and police pleading-report disclosures, address
incompleteness and inaccuracies, and verify previously disclosed
evidence. But to obtain authorization for conducting such a wider
inquiry, the requesting party must demonstrate not only that the
evidence being sought is within the definition of discoverable matter
but also, as required for similar discovery requests in the summary
42. On a finding of convenience or needed policing, the court may authorize targeted
discovery. Rules 11 and 37 provide courts with many additional options to address deficient
pleading-report responses, including fee shifting, punitive sanctions, allowing the jury to draw
adverse inferences from the failure to respond, and entry of judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.
CIv. P. 11; FED. R. CIV. P. 37. For further discussion of judicial use of discovery and other methods
to police compliance as well as sanction noncompliance with the mandate for affirmative, full
disclosure, see infra Section III.B.2-3.
43. See supra note 33. There may also be summary judgment cases involving newly found,
but not asymmetrically held, evidence. If such evidence qualifies as "newly discovered" under Rule
60 or excusably "[u]navailable" under Rule 56, the court may allow the party to file a supplemental
pleading report. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
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judgment context, that the evidentiary questions were previously
unknown despite due diligence.
Settlement. To facilitate discovery efforts, the parties may, at
any point in the reformed pretrial process, mutually agree to undergo
discovery. The agreement can specify the method and extent of inquiry.
But court approval may be required when the parties' agreement to use
discovery requires judicial oversight or presents scheduling or other
management problems.
III. SOCIAL-WELFARE EVALUATION
In this Part, we undertake a comparative social-welfare
evaluation of the proposed reformed and current pretrial processes. The
aim is to determine the better of the two-that is, the regime that
results in the greater social benefit net of social cost in producing
pretrial records. We focus on their relative cost effectiveness in securing
disclosure of discoverable matter, particularly in compelling the parties
to reveal information that damages their own case.
We assume that the pretrial process produces two related levels
of social benefit. First, it generates reliable pretrial records of law and
fact that serve as the primary basis for the parties and courts to resolve
cases on their merits-with or without trial. Second, in facilitating
reliable resolution of cases on their merits, the process thereby
promotes the social objective of optimal deterrence as well as other
public interests in using civil liability to enforce the law. Offsetting
these benefits are the social costs of producing pretrial records, typically
including expenditures of time and money by the courts and parties.
Spending more time and money to produce a pretrial record tends to
increase its reliability, but as with the production of any good, there is
likely a point at which diminishing marginal returns on investment
cannot justify spending any more time or money. Maximizing social
welfare thus entails an incremental tradeoff that results in a residual
degree of unreliability that cannot be reduced by a further reasonable
investment of party and judicial resources. 44
The comparatively best pretrial process minimizes total social
cost: here, the sum of party and court investments in time and money
plus the costs of unreliability. Obviously, investing less time and money
44. For explanation and application of the economics of diminishing marginal returns and
related tradeoffs entailed by transaction costs to the design of legal rules that maximize social
welfare, see Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67
STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1305-10 (2015), which argues that if the legal system is to maximize and not
impair social welfare, courts cannot and should not pursue "truth" at all cost.
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to produce greater reliability (and therefore less unreliability) is
preferable, and as we show, that is the result the proposed reformed
process is designed to achieve. 45
The superiority of the reformed process over the current regime
derives mainly from basic changes to the structure of the parties'
mandate to disclose unfavorable discoverable matter. Notably, the
structural innovation is not substantive in nature. Both the reformed
and current processes mandate disclosure of identical information: all
discoverable matter, favorable and unfavorable. 46 Rather, the key
difference concerns the mode by which the parties satisfy this
substantive requirement. In the current regime, the parties comply
responsively in discovery; they have no legal obligation to reveal any
unfavorable discoverable matter unless and until the opposing party
makes an adequately justified and specified request for it. Thus, the
party seeking private or otherwise hidden relevant information bears
the costly burden of finding it or losing it. By contrast, the reformed
process imposes a legal obligation on the parties to reveal discoverable
matter affirmatively in pleading reports, regardless of whether the
opposing party requests it. In essence, this mandate makes it unlawful
to keep relevant information hidden or, more generally, to be less than
fully forthcoming.
In comparing the relative cost effectiveness of the basic
structural differences in the current and reformed processes' mandates,
we first assume that the parties (named and potential litigants and
their lawyers) will forthrightly disclose unfavorable discoverable
matter at least to the extent required by the rules of the respective
regimes. Recognizing that this "ideal situation" may not be an entirely
accurate reflection of reality, we will later relax the forthrightness
assumption to consider the parties' disinclination to reveal damaging
information and the related costs incurred to obtain more forthcoming
compliance with the rules. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the
ideal situation as "Party Forthrightness" and the latter as "Party
Opportunism."47 Our analysis of the rival regimes demonstrates the
45. Beyond the scope of this Article is a more comprehensive comparative assessment
covering, for example, relative effects on rates of settlement versus trial, mix of case filings, overall
litigation cost, risk bearing and deterrence, gaming incentives, and complementary relationships
with markets and social mores as well as with other governmental law enforcement agencies.
46. The substantive identity of the regimes' disclosure mandates implies that the parties
must reveal all discoverable matter that they actually and, based on predisclosure investigation,
should know.
47. Lawyer and client incentives to act opportunistically-ranging from withholding
discoverable matter (until cornered and caught by direct requests or court order) to outright
dissembling or even concealment-may diverge. We shall focus on lawyers' incentives, as their
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superiority of the reformed process on all dimensions and in both
situations.
A. Party Forthrightness
Given party forthrightness, it should be evident from the
foregoing that the reformed process will substantially outperform the
current regime. The changeover to the affirmative, full-disclosure
mandate virtually implies the comparative advantage of the reformed
process. In a single stroke, the mandate outlaws keeping discoverable
matter secret; requires disclosure of all relevant information without
prior request, thereby relegating hide-and-seek discovery and its costs
to the dustbin; and restricts discovery (if any) to the post-pleading-
report stage and court-targeted uses.
Augmenting its cost-effective gains in pretrial-record reliability,
the reformed process enforces the affirmative-disclosure mandate by
subjecting each pleading report directly to Rule 56 merits review.
Again, the benefits are manifold. Assigning pleading reports the burden
of disclosing all discoverable matter and making them directly
reviewable for legal and evidentiary sufficiency under Rule 56 clears
from the path to resolving cases on their merits time-wasting and often-
abused Rule 12 merits review. Relatedly, the reformed process
eliminates the Twombly-Iqbal rule, thereby revoking not merely its
license for keeping relevant information hidden but also its perverse
payout of higher rewards (Rule 12 dismissal) for hiding more damaging
evidence. Further, replacing Twombly-Iqbal with the mandate to
correct information asymmetries in responsive pleading reports
salvages potentially meritorious cases that the current process would
otherwise arbitrarily dismiss outright.
Though the parties are willing to cooperate, it is the pleading
report-summary judgment nexus that drives, focuses, and disciplines
their compliance with the affirmative-disclosure mandate. Thus, by
conditioning the availability of Rule 56 review on the absence of any
material asymmetric-information problems in the challenged pleading
report, the reformed process creates strong incentives for parties
seeking the cost-saving benefits of summary judgment to quickly and
fully correct such problems by responsive pleading report (or
affirmatively by stipulation in support of the summary judgment
motion). More generally, subjecting each pleading report to immediate
clients will usually need their attorney's complicity in planning and carrying out an opportunistic
scheme.
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Rule 56 review nullifies the inefficiencies (and abuses) of the discovery
subsidy. In the reformed process, the threat of summary judgment
motivates the parties, before filing pleading reports, to reasonably
investigate as thoroughly as possible-at their own expense-the
merits of their respective claims and defenses (and those expected from
their adversaries). This prefiling investigatory burden includes
substantiating any claimed information asymmetries that would
require the responding party to correct. Thus, in the absence of such a
problem, the reformed process confronts parties with an unavoidable
choice: file a summary judgment-proof case or none at all.
In considering whether, as compared to the current-regime
baseline, the reformed process adds new or increases existing pretrial
costs, we anticipate and examine potential problems: burdening courts
with more information-disclosure disputes, pricing out of court
economically marginal claims and defenses, and erasing savings from
the Twombly-Iqbal blanket-dismissal rule. In the course of addressing
each of these concerns in detail below, we underscore a general reason
for expecting lower, more controllable costs in the reformed process. The
overarching explanation is that the distinctive incentive for parties to
file summary judgment-proof pleading reports will generate highly
enriched and reliable, issue-focused information that should greatly
improve the efficacy of party and court decisionmaking. Our central
conclusion is that the only real concern relates to ridding the system of
Twombly-Iqbal, but any added costs from this reform, if more than
negligible, will not significantly degrade the social-welfare advantages
from eliminating the rule.
1. Information-Disclosure Disputes
The reformed process cannot end information-disclosure
disputes, but it should substantially reduce their frequency and
intensity. A good example involves the currently common conflicts in
discovery regarding whether certain requested information is relevant
to a pleaded claim or defense and therefore discoverable. This problem
usually arises because the parties may plead claims and defenses in
conclusory, self-serving terms and defer definitional clarification to the
discovery stage. This practice compounds the costly process of setting
and policing Rule 26(b) limitations on the scope of discovery. In
contrast, such relevance questions will rarely encumber the reformed
process for the simple reason that questions provoking definitional
ambiguities will rarely arise. Required to make a summary judgment-
proof showing in their pleading reports, the parties must know and, in
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demonstrating the sufficiency of their legal and evidentiary case, must
specify exactly what they mean to claim and interpose by way of
defense. And with the summary judgment-proof pleading reports in
hand, the court will possess ample information and understanding with
which to readily discern the relevance of any matter about which
disclosure is in dispute.
It might nonetheless be suggested that the reformed process will
reintroduce disputes over the type of elusive, hairsplitting distinctions
between allegations of fact and those of ultimate fact or conclusions of
fact that plagued code pleading or, at minimum, further complicate
similar disputes currently engendered by plausibility pleading.48
However, the reformed process will present no such problems. It
preempts reincarnation of code-pleading technicalities in plausibility
pleading by eliminating the Twombly-Iqbal rule and Rule 12 merits
review. Nor will it introduce special or new distinctions in the nature of
discoverable matter that its mandate requires parties to disclose. The
reformed process changes only the disclosure format from discovery to
pleading report and its timing from sometime in the near-term future
to the start of litigation. Indeed, subjecting pleading reports directly to
Rule 56 merits review, rather than being disruptive, will further reduce
current complexities and formalities. Rule 56 involves well-established,
understood, and accepted prescriptions and routines for parties to
marshal and for courts to evaluate the quality and quantity of evidence
(and the affidavits and other means for creating a pretrial record of it).
2. Economically Marginal Claims and Defenses
Eliminating the discovery subsidy and obligating parties to
conduct, at their own expense, reasonable prefiling investigations for
discoverable matter to which they have superior public-domain access
may operate to raise the price of "entry" for filing some claims and
defenses. Given that parties are currently required by Rule 11 to
conduct prefiling investigation for evidence supporting the pleadings-
implicitly precluding reasonably avoidable inaccuracies in factual
allegations-the reformed process imposes only the additional cost for
presenting the fruits of that investigation in a pleading report.49 But
48. For a summary of code-pleading problems, past and present, see Bone, supra note 23, at
862-64.
49. If a systematic price-out effect hampers socially needed litigation, Congress can remedy
the problem with a tailored discovery subsidy or adjustment to the means and burdens of obtaining
discoverable matter in the public domain. Of course, the problem can also be addressed by courts
or legislatures changing the substantive rules, for example, by replacing the negligence standard
with strict liability.
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once the benefits are considered, the assumed reality of a higher barrier
to entry should disappear. Any added cost to present evidence in the
pleading-report stage will be far more than offset by the savings from
avoiding having to seek and make such disclosures in the postpleading
discovery stage of the current process. By lowering expected pretrial
litigation costs overall, the net result of the reformed process will likely
be to render the filing of previously marginal claims and defenses more,
and not less, economically feasible and hence to enable presentation
and resolution of more disputes on their merits.50
3. Twombly-Iqbal Savings
The one area where the reformed process may increase costs
relative to the current regime is in revoking the Twombly-Iqbal rule
and eliminating Rule 12 merits review. In cases presenting
asymmetric-information problems, the Twombly-Iqbal-Rule 12 nexus
spares responding parties and courts significant ligation expense by
speedily dismissing deficiently pleaded claims and defenses and by
avoiding corrective discovery to salvage potentially meritorious cases.
We emphasize at the outset that a finding of added cost from
requiring corrective disclosures and adjudication of salvaged cases on
their merits in the reformed process would represent only one side of
the social-welfare evaluation. The other consists of benefits from more
50. This is a specific response to the pointed empirical criticism of our proposal that it might
price out marginal cases. In arguing that these cases would gain, not lose, economic feasibility in
the reformed process, however, we do not mean to forecast a significant increase in litigation or
court dockets and workload. It is doubtful this would occur. First, of course, what would make
these cases more economically feasible is our proposal's substantial reduction of pretrial burdens
on litigants and courts, notably by eliminating unnecessarily costly, hide-and-seek discovery.
Thus, even if the efficiencies of the reformed process enabled more marginal cases to enter the
system for adjudication of their merits, which one might think a good in itself, it does not follow
that burdens on parties and courts would actually increase relative to those imposed by the current
regime. Yet the overall rate and volume of litigation may well remain roughly the same in the
reformed compared to the current process. More likely to change is the mix of cases in the queue
contending for access to the system. Cf. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 915-16 (1984) (arguing
that classing small-stake claims does not give them an advantage over non-class actions for
accessing the system but rather merely enables class actions to join the queue of cases competing
for access based on their relative marketability to plaintiffs' lawyers). Some previously marginal
cases might turn out to be more economically viable to litigate than some cases that previously
would have been regarded as a shoo-in. What the resulting mix will look like, and which cases will
win and lose in the competition to attract competent legal representation and get heard and
decided by judges, is virtually impossible to predict, especially given that the benefits of the
reformed process accrue to all cases across the board, marginal and strongly viable alike. Nor is it
possible for us to undertake the complex normative analysis of whether one mix versus another,
certain types of winners versus others, or even more marginal cases decided on the merits would
improve social welfare.
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reliable pretrial records and merits-based resolution of cases. In the
end, the social-welfare assessment of the reformed process turns not on
whether revoking the Twombly-1qbal blanket-exclusion rule raises the
costs of reliability but rather on whether reliability benefits remain
dominant. Our conclusion, based on the foregoing analysis showing
improved reliability, is that they do.5 1 The following analysis indicates
that the benefits of greater reliability are degraded little, if at all, in
extending the affirmative-disclosure mandate to salvage potentially
meritorious cases.
To clarify the comparative costs of pretrial processes with and
without the Twombly-Iqbal-Rule 12 nexus, we specify its ends and
means. In essence, the ends are apparent from the nature of the
purported savings: speedy and cheap dismissal of some "weak" cases
and corresponding avoidance of the great expense of full-scale,
subsidized, and potentially abusive hide-and-seek discovery. These
results are accomplished in streamlined fashion by courts, simply and
rather subjectively (hence shielded from appellate review) testing the
pleaded factual allegations-more accurately, the absence of pleaded
factual allegations-to determine whether the asymmetric-information
problem renders the claim or defense "implausible." Although the
plausibility test will dismiss and preempt discovery in many cases, the
great majority of cases will likely pass its rather low and porous
threshold-albeit after paying a considerable toll for unnecessary
merits review under Rule 12.
In terms of avoiding discovery expense and screening out weak
cases, it should be apparent that the reformed process will do a far
better job without the Twombly-Iqbal-Rule 12 nexus than the current
regime does with it. The reformed process outlaws the dodgy practices
of adversarial pleading and hide-and-seek discovery. And by requiring
parties to self-finance investigation for all nonasymmetrically held
information and restricting discovery to the post-pleading-report stage,
the reformed process ends subsidized, full-scale discovery and, with it,
the parties' incentive to make dragnet requests and dumping responses.
Further, it immediately screens the merits of all cases, not just those
presenting asymmetric-information problems and not merely by the
grossly unreliable Rule 12 plausibility test. Rather, the reformed
process employs the demanding procedures and standards of Rule 56
summary judgment. Thus, when a responsive pleading is required to
51. To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies or analyses in the commentary
evaluating the reliability differential between pretrial processes with and without the Twombly-
Iqbal-Rule 12 nexus.
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correct an asymmetric-information problem, the initiating pleading
report generally will be demonstrably meritorious, having made a
summary judgment-proof showing or, together with the opposing
party's pleading report, creating a record of sufficient legal and
evidentiary support for any element of the claim or defense involved
that is unrelated to the problem.
We narrow the cost comparison to cases that the current process
would oust for implausibility but the reformed process would continue
adjudicating contingent on correction of the asymmetric-information
problem in a responsive pleading. Despite resolving more cases on their
merits, the reformed process will likely reduce, not add, costs because
of its basic structural differences from the rival regimes. First, by
contrast to the current, relatively lax, if capricious, Twombly-Iqbal-
Rule 12 plausibility test, the corrective-pleading-report requirement
applies only if the unchallenged elements of the claim or defense
involved did or would survive Rule 56 merits screening and, moreover,
only if the absence of the asymmetrically held information creates a
materially prejudicial gap in the record relating to the Rule 56-
challenged element(s). Second, the current gateway opens to full-scale,
hide-and-seek discovery, whereas summary judgment screening in the
reformed process triggers an obligation to affirmatively correct a
specified information asymmetry in a responsive pleading report.
Third, further adjudication of cases that have passed initial summary
judgment screening to final judgment under Rule 56 or by trial depends
entirely on the showing of legally sufficient merit in, or based on, the
responsive-pleading-report disclosures. However, nothing in the
Court's concern about weak cases generating full-scale discovery costs
suggests that adjudicating such salvaged, summary judgment-
screened cases to final judgment on the merits should count as a waste
of system resources.
Responding parties and courts will incur expense respectively in
carrying out and overseeing compliance with the mandate- to correct
prejudicial information asymmetries. In a large majority of cases, these
costs-for searching, reviewing relevance and privilege, producing the
information, and policing the process-will be small and often border
on negligible. 52 The specification and substantiation of an existing and
prejudicial asymmetric-information problem will sharply define the
relevance and scope of the needed inquiry and discovery matter.
Normally, the responding party's Rule 56 motion will effectively narrow
52. As previously noted, oral depositions will rarely be needed, though the parties may agree
to that method of inquiry.
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the scope of the problem and related corrective disclosure by precisely
stipulating (or waiving some of) the evidentiary gap as grounds for
summary judgment. Overall, the disclosure mandate in most cases will
probably call for production of information in a relatively few records or
affidavits.53
Certainly, some cases will arise in which, despite the best efforts
to sharpen the prejudicial information-asymmetry problem, its
correction would involve costly disclosures. Nevertheless, nothing
approaching full-scale, hide-and-seek discovery will ensue. Based on
the initial and subsequently filed summary judgment-proof pleading
reports, courts will be sufficiently informed to effectively manage the
competing objectives of securing needed information and avoiding
unnecessary disclosure burdens. Judicial options would include staging
the exchange of pleading reports-for example, by ordering the
responding party to identify the substantive content of key documents
and personal knowledge of principal witnesses-and, in a follow-up
stage, directing the production of the most promising documents and
affidavits. At the first or a subsequent stage, the responding party
might also be required to undertake and report the results from further
targeted, self-financed investigation conducted by its own lawyers or, in
some cases, by independent counsel. The court would reserve the power
to halt the process at any stage on a finding that the previously revealed
information either suffices for resolving the pending summary
judgment motion(s) or demonstrates the futility of further inquiry.
In managing this process, courts should beware of making two
generally unrecognized assumptions that tend to exaggerate
assessment of responding-party disclosure costs in complex cases-
specifically to (1) search for potentially relevant information and (2)
review that information for its relevance or privileged nature. The first
elides the basic question: Compared to what? In particular, how much
does the reformed process really add to responding parties' disclosure
costs compared to what they otherwise would or should be expected to
incur if Twombly-Iqbal governed their fate? The difference is likely to
be significantly less than is commonly believed. Indeed, much of the
evidence that the reformed process calls upon the responding party to
reveal in a pleading report would or should have been obtained at
roughly the same disclosure cost, albeit kept hidden, in the current
regime. In either regime, to effectively represent the responding party
from the outset (or in anticipation) of litigation, competent counsel
53. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 23, at 455-56 (canvassing cases dismissed pursuant
to the Twombly-Iqbal rule).
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needs to know the same thing-all discoverable matter, especially the
potentially damaging evidence-and therefore will perform the same
work of thoroughly investigating, collecting, and reviewing all private
or public sources of information to acquire it. In any event, Rule 11
requires parties in the current regime to possess supporting evidence to
back contentions or denials of fact, including those asserting the factual
implausibility of an opposing claim or defense as grounds for Rule 12
dismissal under Twombly-Iqbal.5 4 As such, the main difference between
the rival regimes regarding disclosure costs related to such evidence is
that responding parties in the reformed process incur the expense of
formally filing such evidence in their pleading reports, while currently
they can hide their evidentiary hand at no expense.
The other misleading assumption holds that the Twombly-Iqbal
rule shields responding parties from incurring substantial costs of
searching through and reviewing numerous documents and other
54. Consider, for example, the Twombly and Iqbal defendants' attacks on the factual
plausibility of inculpatory inferences drawn from facts alleged in the plaintiffs' respective
complaints. In Twombly, the defendants denied the plausibility of inferring from public statements
by one of their CEOs that he meant to suggest their refusal to compete against each other resulted
from concerted action, not independent business judgements. Stressing the CEO's knowledge of
and remarks on the regulatory environment, the defendants contended that he meant nothing
more than that competition was not a "sound long-term business plan" for any of them. Brief for
Petitioners at 36, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126). Similarly, in Iqbal,
the defendants, the attorney general and FBI director, denied that just because they authored and
were the highest-ranking DOJ officials responsible for effectuating the post-9/11 "person of high
interest" incarceration policy involved, it was plausible to infer that they closely monitored and
managed its use, including by knowingly approving the alleged invidiously discriminatory
conditions of the plaintiffs imprisonment. It was, the defendants asserted, "highly implausible" to
infer that "the Attorney General and the FBI Director were involved in the granular decisions
about which respondent complains." Brief for the Petitioners at 36-37, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) (No. 07-1015). No evidence was presented to back up these factual contentions, that the
CEO in Twombly meant only to offer a benign rationale for the defendants' refraining from
competition and that the defendants in Iqbal were too busy with other matters to be involved in
implementing their vitally important policy for swiftly identifying and imprisoning terrorists, their
accomplices, and would-be attackers in the New York area. In the current regime, of course, the
defendants had no obligation to disclose the evidence, though Rule 11 required them to possess it.
In the reformed process-assuming the Court and Congress do not create special rules for
adjudicating antitrust or qualified immunity cases-the defendants would be mandated to both
possess the evidence and disclose it in their pleading reports or risk dismissal on summary
judgment. The mandated disclosure in Twombly would impose the relatively narrow obligation on
the defendants to file the executive's affidavit stating his intended meaning and, assuming he
affirmed it was benign, as he effectively did before the Supreme Court, whether he had said,
believed, or done anything to the contrary. A broader category of disclosure might be required in
Iqbal. In responding to the evidential inference from their authorship and control of the
antiterrorism interdiction and imprisonment program to their knowledge and authorization of its
illegal implementation, the defendants would describe in affidavits their relationship to its day-
to-day operation. Assuming they denied any operational involvement, as they effectively did in the
Supreme Court, the defendants would identify those in charge of running the program. If questions
(unrelated to impeachment) were raised or left unanswered by these affidavits, the defendants
might also be required to conduct and produce the results of an independent DOJ investigation.
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sources of potentially discoverable matter and implies the corollary that
eliminating the rule, as we propose, would reimpose this burden. These
suppositions conflict with the reality in many cases: responding parties,
particularly businesses, governments, and other institutions, would
incur the search and review expense, with or without the Twombly-
Iqbal rule. Strongly motivated to protect and promote their profit,
political, market, and other interests, these parties normally seek and
acquire discoverable (along with nondiscoverable) matter ex ante in the
course of assessing and controlling the risks of their products, policies,
projects, and other activities to assure compliance with the law.5 5
Indeed, it is unlikely that the Twombly-Iqbal escape route from
privately enforced civil liability diminishes these incentives at all, given
that parties are constantly exposed to an array of other sources of law
enforcement, including federal, state, and local administrative
regulation; legislative investigation and lawmaking; criminal
prosecution; and executive civil actions for injunctions and sanctions.
Thus, long before the onset or even anticipation of litigation,
institutional risk takers will-or, as a matter of best business practice
as well as prescribed legal obligation, should-have investigated and
analyzed the relevant evidence for ex ante compliance purposes.
Performing due diligence, they will likely have invested at least as
much (and probably a great deal more) in obtaining discoverable matter
ex ante than such parties would ex post to correct an information
asymmetry in the reformed process. If and when litigation arises, the
expense of this ex ante legal-compliance work will largely represent a
sunk cost for the responding parties, often leaving them with little more
burden in the reformed process than to organize the previously acquired
discoverable matter for submission in a pleading report. It follows that
when the discoverable matter in question was or should have been
obtained ex ante for legal-compliance purposes, courts should overrule
responding-party pleas for staging or otherwise modulating the
purported burden of correcting the information asymmetry and enforce
the affirmative-disclosure mandate full bore.
55. Such investment in managing risks ex ante to prevent them from exceeding at least
legally determined levels is a fundamental element of our system of law enforcement; without it,
the law would fail to accomplish its safety and other regulatory objectives. Despite the pervasive
presence of ex post policing by a multiplicity of government agencies, deterrence-based law
enforcement would prove a nullity if it did not effectively compel-together with and amplified by
political, market, media, and other social forces-ex ante legal compliance.
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B. Party Opportunism
One commentator on an early draft of this Article astutely
observed that much more of the pretrial process could be eliminated
than we proposed if only lawyers would refrain from abusing what
remained. The facts of the recent Supreme Court case Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Haeger5 6 reduce the abstraction of this observation to
reality and provide a chilling and dispiriting impetus for relaxing our
assumption of party forthrightness.
In Haeger, the severely injured plaintiff-family members and
their subrogated insurer, Farmers Insurance Company, through
separate counsel (collectively, "plaintiffs") sued Goodyear in 2005,
charging that the failure of its G159 tire caused their motor home to
swerve off an Arizona highway and flip over.5 7 Their complaint, like
others in similar G159 tire suits against Goodyear across the country,
generally alleged various negligence and product liability claims,
including that the tire, marketed initially for light trucks and vans, was
"unreasonably dangerous as a result of either manufacturing and/or
design which proximately caused the accident and Plaintiffs' injuries."58
From the beginning and throughout the lengthy discovery stage,
the plaintiffs sought to flesh out their defective design claim by
repeatedly requesting Goodyear to produce all reports and data from
G159 safety and performance tests.59 In response, Goodyear early on
produced a report involving the results of low-speed tests, and after over
a year of the plaintiffs pressing their requests for all test results,
Goodyear turned over another report regarding a high-speed test.60 The
defendant represented to the plaintiffs and court that no other G159
test reports or information existed. 61
Sometime after the parties settled in 2011, one of the plaintiffs'
counsel read an article stating that in another G159 litigation,
Goodyear had produced heat-rise test data that it had previously failed
to disclose in any other case, including Haeger.62 In the subsequent
proceedings for sanctions, conducted by the judge who had presided
over the Haeger case, Goodyear acknowledged that the heat-rise test
56. (Haeger Ill), 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017).
57. Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Haeger 1), 906 F. Supp. 2d 938, 941 (D. Ariz.
2012), aff'd, 813 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2016), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017).
58. Complaint T 21, Haeger I, 906 F. Supp. 2d 938 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CV2005-050959).
59. Haeger III, 137 S. Ct. at 1184.
60. Haeger I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 944, 950.
61. Id. at 950-51.
62. Id. at 958-59.
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data were relevant to the material issue of design defect in Haeger, that
it also possessed a number of other pertinent test reports, and that two
of its senior defense attorneys deliberately concealed the existence of
this evidence from the plaintiffs and the court.63
The Haeger case drives home two important points. First, it
shows that lawyers do not always follow the rules. Thus, in reality, it
cannot be taken for granted that they would actually comply with the
reformed process's mandate for affirmative disclosure of all information
that may damage their clients' case. And second, it shows that this
problem of dishonesty, including the most blatant sort, exists even in
the current pretrial process. This second point is critical because it
makes clear that the inquiry with respect to party opportunism seeks
to determine the relative cost of abuse (in terms of the rate, severity,
and policing) in the current versus reformed processes.
With these points in mind, we compare the costs in the rival
regimes of three types of abuse:
* extortion (i.e., filing claims and defenses to extract nuisance-
value settlement payoffs) 6 4
* obstruction (i.e., unresponsiveness aimed at burdening and
derailing opposing-party efforts to find and obtain
discoverable matter, such as stonewalling, obfuscating,
delaying, misleading, and dissembling)
* concealment (i.e., preventing revelation of discoverable
matter by hiding or, if need be, destroying the evidence)
Our central conclusion is that the reformed process will likely
reduce the total cost from party opportunism. Its superiority over
discovery in the current regime derives primarily from the reformed
process's mandate for affirmative disclosure of discoverable matter. In
essence, compelling the parties to file summary judgment-proof
pleading reports at the start of the litigation provides better structural
disincentives against extortion and more developed and focused
information for detecting and deterring obstructionism and
concealment.
63. Id. at 968. Working at separate firms, one served as local counsel in Haeger, and the other
as the national coordinating counsel for the G159 litigation, including among his chief
responsibilities reviewing and formulating responses to discovery in all cases. Id. at 941.
64. See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (explaining a defendant's willingness to settle
for a positive amount even though it knows the case is too weak for a plaintiff to pursue it to trial).
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1. Extortion
The plausibility test in Twombly addresses the Court's major
concern that requiring merely Conley notice pleading facilitated
extortion strategies. It enabled plaintiffs, in particular, to file weak
cases on the cheap to confront defendants with the choice of bearing the
high costs of full-scale discovery or settling for some lower "in terrorem
increment." 65 The plausibility test exploits information asymmetries to
screen out weak (along with potentially meritorious) cases, while
plaintiffs' increased expenditures on related prefiling investigation may
somewhat reduce the spread between their costs of bringing suit and
defendants' costs of undergoing full-scale discovery. The question is
whether, in replacing the plausibility test backed by Rule 12 merits
review with the mandate for affirmative disclosure of discoverable
matter in pleading reports backed by Rule 56 merits review, the
reformed process will significantly increase the level of extortion above
the current baseline.
Our conclusion is not merely that no increase should be
expected. Rather, the reformed process promises to virtually eliminate
the abuse. The reformed process achieves this result for the simple
reason that it drastically reduces the spread between the low cost of
filing weak cases and the high cost of undergoing responsive discovery
that makes extortion profitable in the current regime. The price of filing
claims and defenses will increase considerably because the initiating
pleading report must, as a practical necessity, make a summary
judgment-proof case on all elements unaffected by a material
65. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). In addition to the defects in the Twombly Court's analysis noted earlier,
the majority also failed to recognize that defendants are not the only possible victims of this
extortion strategy; they can readily assert weak defenses to impose nuisance-value settlement
pressures on plaintiffs. Apparently, the Court adopted the conventional assumption that
defendants are more likely to be victimized because they, particularly businesses and other
nongovernmental institutions, usually possess most of the relevant information and incur greater
costs than would plaintiffs to produce it. But this assumption is problematic in many cases in
which defendants can leverage weak defenses for extortion purposes, for example by burdening
plaintiffs in antitrust, employment discrimination, and other complex litigation with great expense
for expert analysis of reams of records and data, or in conventional tort cases with costly discovery
regarding comparative negligence. Moreover, even when the assumption of defendants'
disproportionate discovery exposure holds, the Court erred in ignoring the relative adverse effect
of extortionate discovery cost on the economic viability of plaintiffs' claims, particularly those
prosecuted on contingent, percentage-fee arrangements or in mass tort cases without class action
to buffer the adjudicative biasing effects of separate-action litigation. See David Rosenberg &
Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 305 (2014) (showing that the separate-action process, as compared to class
actions, creates a prodefendant bias and that outside of class or functionally equivalent
collectivized actions, there is no non-class action rule or practical means for solving this problem).
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asymmetric-information problem. Developing such a case will require
an extensive, self-financed investment in prefiling investigation. At the
same time, the reformed process sharply lowers the costs of
discoverable-matter disclosure. This latter result is achieved by
eliminating current extortion-prone discovery, characterized by hide-
and-seek gaming, subsidized usage, and virtually uncheckable party
discretion to threaten an adversary with an overbearing, full-scale
inquisition. In its place, the reformed process restricts discovery, if any,
to the post-pleading-report stage and court-specified scope, targets, and
methods.
With higher expected costs of filing initial summary judgment-
proof pleading reports and much lower expected costs of restricted
discovery, the remaining leverage for extracting ransom derives from
the burden on responding parties to disclose discoverable matter in
their pleading reports.66 However, at this point in the reformed process,
the extortion problem loses its premise-that responding parties may
be forced to settle weak claims and defenses. Subjecting initial pleading
reports directly to Rule 56 review assures that, far from being weak, the
surviving claims or defenses have demonstrable legal and evidentiary
merit. At the very least, summary judgment sufficiency on a challenged
claim or defense will have been established to the extent its elements
are unaffected by an asymmetric-information problem.
The obligation to file a responsive pleading report thus resolves
into correcting a specified information asymmetry relating to an
otherwise trial-worthy claim or defense. But before that mandate
becomes effective, the initiating party must specify the nature of the
discoverable matter, substantiate that it exists within the responding
party's exclusive or superior practical control, and show that its absence
creates a prejudicial gap in the record on summary judgment. And as
pointed out above, the court is empowered to stage and otherwise
modulate the substance and means of the corrective disclosures. In view
of these constraints on the expected costs of the corrective-disclosure
mandate, together with the higher expected costs of satisfying the
initial-disclosure mandate to present a summary judgment-proof case,
there is little chance that the initiating party will profit from and
therefore attempt extortion.
66. We ignore the expense of moving for Rule 56 merits review in the reformed process as it
is unlikely to cost responders more than current motions for Rule 12 merits review.
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2. Obstruction
As we use the term, obstruction involves a party scheming to
avoid revealing unfavorable information for as long as possible but not
going so far as to deliberately and permanently conceal it.
Obstructionism is a natural outgrowth of hide-and-seek discovery and
probably represents the most prevalent type of litigation abuse in the
current regime. Far too numerous and varied to catalogue,
obstructionist tactics have the coherent purpose or knowing effect of not
only misleading, burdening, delaying, restricting, and otherwise
impeding disclosure of unfavorable discoverable matter but also
exhausting the requesting party's economic resources to pursue fruitful
lines of analysis and inquiry to find the evidence. However, despite the
aim to impede revelation of the information, the responding party is
willing (albeit begrudgingly) to disclose it-if and when tracked down,
cornered, and tagged by the requesting party or court.
The reformed process should greatly reduce the incidence of
obstructionist abuses. Its most powerful counterforce against
obstruction, as with other forms of opportunism, is the pretrial record
created by summary judgment-proof pleading reports, which puts
potentially victimized courts and parties in the well-informed position
to effectively detect and sanction misbehavior.
The stonewalling, obfuscation, and other common varieties of
obstructionism in Haeger make this case a useful example of the
principal defects in the current discovery regime and structural
advantages of the reformed process that render it less vulnerable to
abuse. In seeking to avoid disclosing its G159 test results, Goodyear
deployed (1) opaque and unspecified boilerplate objections of
irrelevance, overbreadth, and burdensomeness; (2) evasive responses
consisting of half-truths, befogging quibbles over semantics, and
obdurate refusal to comply with production requests that failed to
specify tests by bureaucratically, technically, and scientifically precise
types and titles; and (3) diversionary partial disclosures, creating the
illusion that all existing evidence had been produced. 67 Ultimately,
Goodyear's obfuscations succeeded in preventing the plaintiffs from
finding not only the heat-rise report it subsequently disclosed in
another G159 case but also a number of other reports concerning the
tire's durability (which Goodyear was never compelled to reveal in any
67. Haeger I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 943-51.
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G159 case and disclosed only during the Haeger sanctions proceedings,
"apparently by accident").68
Goodyear's "success" was largely due to the problematic
structure of discovery. The current regime forces plaintiffs to play the
adversarial hide-and-seek discovery game that leaves them and courts
with the burden, but bereft of information needed, to expose and
overcome the defendant's obstructionist scheme. Thus, as the Haeger
plaintiffs flailed about in the dark for clues of hidden test evidence,
Goodyear was free to evade detection behind smokescreens of seemingly
plausible, but actually unsupportable, objections. Meanwhile, the court
"referee[d]" the game on the fly without the information required to
make reliable calls. 69
More particularly, lacking knowledge of the availability,
identity, and location of what they were seeking, the plaintiffs had no
alternative but to generally request production of all "[t]esting
documentation."70 The generality of these requests allowed Goodyear to
"respond[ ]" with "boilerplate" objections and without disclosing any of
the unfavorable discoverable matter.71 Even though, in the early phase
of discovery, the plaintiffs clarified their defect theory as centering on
overheating, Goodyear consistently managed to bury the heat-factor
issue and refocus discovery requests and disputes exclusively on
speed.72 For example, when the court spent a few minutes inquiring
about any outstanding production requests for G159 tests, Goodyear
quickly narrowed and diverted discussion to a previously requested but
as-yet-undisclosed highway-speed report.73 With the record consisting
of little more than the complaint's mere allegation that the tires were
"unreasonably dangerous as a result of either manufacturing and/or
design," the plaintiffs' counsel was unable to redirect the court's
attention from speed to focus on the heat factor. 74 As a result, the
judge's only order directing disclosure concerned the highway speed
test.75
Despite the plaintiffs' discovery efforts, including oral deposition
of Goodyear's chief expert and Rule 30(b)(6) witness, the G159 heat-rise
68. Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Haeger 11), 813 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2016),
rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017).
69. Haeger III, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1184 (2017).
70. Haeger II, 813 F.3d at 1238 (alteration in original).
71. Haeger I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
72. Id. at 942.
73. Id. at 948-49.
74. Complaint, supra note 58, ¶ 21.
75. Haeger I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 949-51.
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test never would have surfaced were it not for its disclosure in a later
G159 case.76 According to Goodyear, it felt compelled to disclose the test
there because the plaintiff specifically requested the test by subject or
name.77 This suggests that had the plaintiffs in Haeger only known the
correct passwords, they would have obtained not only the heat-rise
report but also reports of the various other technically coded and named
tests-including bead durability, crown durability, W16, W64, G09, and
L04 78-that were never disclosed in any case before being accidentally
revealed in the sanctions proceeding. 79
Had Haeger arisen under the reformed process, Goodyear would
have been obligated to affirmatively and fully disclose all discoverable
matter immediately in its responsive pleading report. Their disclosures
would have provided all relevant information relating to the plaintiffs'
defective design claim. Pursuant to the affirmative-disclosure mandate
in the reformed process, Goodyear would have been obligated to correct
the information asymmetry regarding G159 performance reports and
test data by producing all of it, heat-rise and otherwise, without any
plaintiff request or court order.
Goodyear would have expected that the plaintiffs' summary
judgment-proof pleading-report complaint on the design defect claim,
among others, would "corner" it into confessing the test evidence. It is
reasonable to surmise that the complaint would have presented a
multidimensional evidentiary as well as legal showing, crafted both to
establish the trial worthiness of their case and to close off possible
obstructionist routes for Goodyear to evade the affirmative-disclosure
mandate. Thus, in excluding nondefect causes, the pleading-report
complaint would have proffered the plaintiffs' affidavits, police
accident-scene and forensic investigations, and other evidence
regarding the motor home's preaccident speed, load, usage,
performance, and, of course, the before-and-after condition of its failed
and other G159 tires.
Also, it would have presented reports of one or more experts
explaining the tire's design, manufacturing, and marketing, with
specific focus on the heat-rise theory of its defect. These experts would
have substantiated their opinions based on general and tire-safety
product-design principles; Department of Transportation ("DOT") test
requirements; published, peer-reviewed heat-factor and other tire-
76. Id. at 951-52, 959.
77. Id. at 963.
78. Id. at 955.
79. Haeger II, 813 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2016), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017).
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safety studies; and possibly data from the plaintiffs' self-financed tests.
In addition, expert affiants with knowledge of the tire-manufacturing
industry would have explained the state of the art in tire-safety design
and testing, particularly homing in on heat-rise problems from
mismatched use of light-truck tires on heavy, full-sized motor homes
and from compounding factors such as motor homes traveling at
highway speeds on Arizona's hot roads midsummer. It is also likely that
the expert evidence would have identified the bureaucratic, technical,
and code names for some or all of the tire-industry safety and durability
tests. Precluding Goodyear from attempting to escape the disclosure
mandate, the pleading-report complaint would have specified and
substantiated Goodyear's asymmetric control over its safety-test
reports, data, and related information.
To assess the relative effectiveness of the reformed process in
detecting and deterring abuse, we consider, more particularly,
scenarios of some obstructionist options that Goodyear exploited in
Haeger. We start from the perspective of the basic structural difference
in the disclosure mandates of the rival processes. The current regime
licensed Goodyear's general obstructionist (as opposed to concealment)
strategy of keeping its tests secret and putting the onus to hunt around
for them, more or less blindly, on the plaintiffs and, at their behest, the
court. In outlawing obstructionism, the reformed process would
mandate Goodyear to affirmatively and fully disclose all of its test
information. Even though this structural difference from the current
regime is theoretical, the reformed process's mandate is not
aspirational; it will make a major difference in practice. Many, and
perhaps most, lawyers practice obstructionism in the belief they are
playing by the adversarial hide-and-seek rules of the game; the
reformed process removes that justification.
Beyond changing lawyers' mindsets about obstructionism, the
teeth in the reformed process should deter them from cheating. Had
Haeger been litigated in the reformed process, the mandate for
affirmative and full disclosure would have cornered Goodyear from
multiple directions. To begin with, Goodyear would be confronted with
the above-described pleading-report complaint that would probably
make a summary judgment-proof case on all elements of the plaintiffs'
design defect claim and certainly on all elements unaffected by
asymmetric information regarding the G159 tests and other
discoverable matter. With the plaintiffs' summary judgment-proof
showing on the design defect claim demonstrating the nature and
relevance of the test evidence, the well-informed court could, if called
upon to deal with a recalcitrant Goodyear, spell out the terms of
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compliance and the consequences of noncompliance. Goodyear, in short,
would see no option but to respond affirmatively and fully in a pleading
report that comprehensively answered the plaintiffs' complaint,
including by revealing all G159 tests.
Yet judicial policing of pleading-report responses may be
unnecessary in many cases. Pressure to disclose asymmetric
information such as the G159 tests would arise internally, as the
reformed process's disclosure mandate would confront the responding
party with the choice between pursuing an obstructionist strategy-
say, of delay-and forfeiting advantageous procedural and substantive
options. The pressure, in essence, results from the basic structural
difference in disclosure mandates for correcting asymmetric-
information problems: the burden falls on the initiating party in the
current regime and on the responding party in the reformed process.
Thus, in the reformed process, the responding party would be precluded
from obtaining summary judgment for the plaintiffs' failure to present
sufficient evidence on an element of their design defect claim where the
prejudicial gap in the record related to an asymmetric-information
problem. For example, Goodyear could not obtain Rule 56 review of the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs' proof of the foreseeability of a G159 heat-
rise risk without disclosing everything it knew about the tire's
durability and performance, including existing test information.
Similarly, unless it comes clean on the tests, Goodyear would have to
sacrifice the state-of-the-art defense, which manufacturers regard as
one of the most important hedges against liability on design defect
claims. If Goodyear was successful in avoiding disclosure of evidence
relating to G159 tests prior to trial, it would be barred from contending
for a jury finding against the plaintiffs on foreseeability or state-of-the-
art questions; indeed, it might even be exposed to a jury finding of
recklessness or liability for punitive damages based on the evidentiary
gap on testing.80
In furthering its obstructionist goals, Goodyear fended off the
plaintiffs' requests for test evidence for years with unsupported
boilerplate objections to relevance, burden, and overbreadth.8 1
Goodyear's strategy would stand little chance of succeeding in the
80. Informal litigation dynamics set in motion by the affirmative-disclosure mandate would
enhance the reformed process's efficiency as well as reliability benefits in many cases. Thus, the
pressure on Goodyear from foreclosure of its Rule 56 defense option and assiduous judicial
commands and policing would leave it little choice but to quickly and indeed "voluntarily" disclose
the test evidence, including privately in confidence before time expired for filing the responsive
pleading report. Not doing so would signal the incriminating nature of the evidence, prompting
the plaintiffs to raise their settlement demand accordingly.
81. Haeger I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
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reformed process. Of course, the current regime does not approve this
type of misconduct; it is just that courts lack sufficient information to
stop it. As the foregoing shows, summary judgment-proof pleading
reports provide the key to effective judicial policing of obstructionism.
Informed by the summary judgment-proof showings in the pleading-
report complaint in support of the design defect claim, the court would
emphatically dismiss the credibility of both Goodyear's objections and
its lawyers.8 2
3. Concealment
In contrast to obstructionism, a party engaging in concealment
intends never to reveal relevant evidence-usually the most pertinent,
damaging information in the case-regardless of how directly an
opposing party requests or a court orders its disclosure. Other
opportunistic options, certainly obstructionism and possibly
extortionate tactics, may be employed to facilitate the illegal scheme.
But in the end, the party will barricade the information behind a wall
of lies, fake bureaucratic complexities, and sworn falsehoods by craven
and mercenary lawyers-and, if need be, destroy it. Lawyer perfidy of
this type is not just the stuff of a John Grisham thriller; all too many
detected cases, implying a far greater number of undetected ones,
confirm the reality of this professional pathology. The fraud Goodyear's
lawyers perpetrated on the court and plaintiffs in Haeger represents
only a recent, particularly flagrant, but hardly unique, example. 83
Neither model of discoverable-matter disclosure-notice-
plausibility pleading and full-scale discovery in the current regime nor
pleading reports in the reformed process-provides a cure-all for
82. Similarly, the court would and should reject any objection that collecting and evaluating
the test evidence imposed an undue burden. Indeed, most and possibly all of these test data and
reports were generated pursuant to DOT regulations. As such, they constitute the paradigmatic
type of information that institutional parties like Goodyear would or should have created,
evaluated, and maintained in an orderly, accessible manner ex ante in the normal course of
assuring that their products, projects, and other activities comply with and can be held accountable
to the law. Thus, marginal costs of producing this discoverable matter in any given case are or
should be negligible. In the reformed process, had Goodyear claimed inability to produce the test
information in the Haeger case, nothing short of an act of God could be invoked to excuse it from
discovery sanctions.
83. See, e.g., Cade Metz, Judge Tells Uber Lawyer: 'It Looks Like You Covered This Up,'N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/business/waymo-uber-trial.html
[https://perma.cc[BD83-HYEH] (referring to confidential information volunteered by the U.S.
attorney, who obtained it during an independent investigation, and describing the court's
reprimand of Uber lawyers on eve of a trade secrets trial for deliberately concealing damaging
evidence and the company for using computer systems to automatically destroy intrafirm
communications).
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concealment. There is good reason to believe, however, that the
reformed process will produce better results.
The key, again, is well-informed parties and courts. Short of a
whistleblower or independent monitoring of the parties' legal
maneuvers, only good detective work by potential party and judicial
victims stands a chance of recognizing the scheme, piercing its
protective shield of fabrications to find what has been hidden (or
destroyed) and where, and punishing the wrongdoers. Doing this work
effectively requires possessing a great deal of concrete information
about the case. The scheme's targets must be alert to their exposure to
fraud, specifically regarding what, how, and where evidence is likely to
be concealed. And they must also be prepared to recognize evasive,
deceptive, and contradictory representations; unusual and suspicious
activity; and other telltale signs of concealment encoded in the
particular case's context.
Hide-and-seek discovery is generally not up to this task; indeed,
it facilitates rather than hinders concealment schemes.84 The reformed
process is far superior. With parties and courts having timely access to
a pretrial record composed of summary judgment-proof pleading
reports providing focused, detailed, developed, and reliable information,
the reformed process should prove substantially more effective in
detecting and deterring concealment.
The informational advantage of the reformed process can be
illustrated by comparing its capacity to the actual performance of
discovery in ferreting out Goodyear's concealment scheme in Haeger.85
Suppose that, in its response to the asymmetric-information problem
specified in the plaintiffs' pleading report, Goodyear filed an expert's
affidavit that represented essentially what the expert and Rule 30(b)(6)
witness actually testified in oral deposition: "I have been told by those
in charge of releasing the tire that a number of different test procedures
were run on it. But I do not presently have any in my possession that I
can attach to this affidavit, and I do not believe any are still available."8 6
Apparently, in the helter-skelter of the discovery process in which the
84. The risk of concealment is often invoked in opposing cutbacks to full-scale discovery.
However, stumbling across concealed evidence in hide-and-seek discovery is a socially problematic
mode of detection. Even if rummaging through a mass of records might by chance turn up the
mythical "smoking gun," the costs of such sweeping, untethered searches would likely swamp the
probative benefits of the seized evidence. Also, it would do little to deter concealment. If the
concealment scheme was any good, its cover-up would be virtually infeasible to penetrate by
discovery.
85. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
86. This hypothetical quotation paraphrases the deposition transcript quoted in Haeger I,
906 F. Supp. 2d at 952.
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pretrial record is a work in progress, the Haeger trial court was left with
too little information to closely examine and probe these
representations. As a result, the judge, as well as the plaintiffs' counsel,
failed to notice, let alone correct, not merely critical ambiguities but also
substantial gaps in the expert's statements. Nor did they recognize, let
alone confront, Goodyear's lawyers with conflicts between their flat
denial of the tests' existence or knowledge about them and their expert's
representations intimating that he and certain Goodyear employees
had previously possessed the tests and had possible information about
their whereabouts and results. Therefore, the judge and the plaintiffs'
counsel ultimately accepted his representations that no test reports
existed except for the two on speed that had previously been produced.87
In the reformed process, by contrast, the trial judge would have
a pretrial record composed at the least of the summary judgment-proof
pleading-report complaint on key, if not all, elements of the design
defect claim. Possessing knowledge derived from that record, the judge
surely would appreciate the crucial nature and importance of the tests,
recognize the ambiguities and gaps in the expert's representations
concerning their existence, and direct Goodyear to rectify the defects.
The court could order Goodyear-based on its corporate knowledge, not
the witness's personal beliefs-to file a supplemental report identifying
"people who were involved in the release of this tire" and the "different
test procedures that [were] run [on it],"88 fully answering the question
whether the test information exists and, if so, producing it forthwith.
The court might also censure and fine Goodyear for its prevarications.
The expert's evident artifice, however, could move the court to take a
different, more forceful approach to deterring opportunism. For
example, the judge could authorize a policing investigation, employing
the plaintiffs' targeted discovery or a magistrate's or special master's
inquiry and taxing the defendant with the costs.89
87. Id. at 953-54.
88. Id. at 952.
89. When effective oversight requires more time and expertise, the presiding judge can
appoint an expert special investigator vested with powers to subpoena witnesses for interrogation
and documents for inspection and to make findings of fact and recommendations for sanctions, if
any, for final decision by the court. If the problem calls for an even stronger mode of investigation,
the court could report the matter to prosecutorial authorities, who could seek search warrants,
including authorization for examining lawyer files. See, e.g., Jack Ewing & Bill Vlasic, German
Authorities Raid U.S. Law Firm Leading Volkswagen's Emissions Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/business/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-investigation-
germany.html [https://perma.cc/44JA-HYX7].
This is not to ignore the reality of the difficulty and cost of detecting concealment or any
deliberate, concerted opportunistic schemes. Law enforcement theory teaches that effective
countermeasures include recalibrating the investment in policing by lowering the costs of detection
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Preventing concealment and other forms of opportunism will
require courts to dynamically and decisively exploit the superior
structural and informational means provided by the reformed process
for enhanced enforcement of the law. This commitment must begin with
taking the problem more seriously. Strange to say this, but stranger
still is what prompts it: the Supreme Court's reaction of resignation,
bordering on indifference, to the nefarious conduct of the defense
lawyers in Haeger. Contrary to the Court's characterization, the case
did not involve merely "contentious discovery battles."" Goodyear's
lawyers, as the trial judge meticulously documented and the court of
appeals confirmed, perpetrated outright "fraud and deceit ... on the
district court." 9 1
CONCLUSION
This Article makes the social-welfare case for the superiority of
the reformed over the current pretrial process. The fundamental
changeover from hide-and-seek discovery to mandatory, affirmative,
and full disclosure of discoverable matter in pleading reports directly
reviewable under Rule 56 should greatly enhance both the reliability of
pretrial records and cost effectiveness of producing them. This change
should increase the rate and quality of merits-based adjudicative and
settlement decisions, with resulting deterrence and other social benefits
from civil liability.
The question remains: What are the chances of these
analytically projected advantages proving out systemically in the
while raising the severity of punishment to maintain deterrence levels. As an example, courts
could randomly authorize targeted investigation by an expert special master for cases that, by
nature or by trip-wire alarms, manifest the need for closer scrutiny. See Robert J. Jackson, Jr. &
David Rosenberg, A New Model of Administrative Enforcement, 93 VA. L. REV. 1983 (2007)
(proposing simple, random sampling to improve administrative enforcement while also cutting
costs). If the random inquiry uncovers misconduct, deterrence requires offsetting the probability
of wrongdoers escaping detection by increasing the severity of sanctions, including professionally
disciplining the offending individual lawyers and their law firms. We note that even though the
trial court in Haeger ordered the attorneys responsible for concealing evidence, together with their
firms and Goodyear, to reimburse $2.7 million of the plaintiffs' total attorney's fees, the Supreme
Court, going against the lessons of law enforcement theory, cut the fee award by around $2 million
to reflect only the fees the plaintiffs would not have incurred but for the misconduct. And even
though the trial court recognized the "unfortunate professional consequences that may flow from
[the fee award] Order," it appears, on last check, that both lawyers remain members in good
standing of their respective state bars. Haeger I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
90. Haeger III, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1184 (2017).
91. Haeger II, 813 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2016), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017).
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federal civil pretrial process? To our knowledge, there is no empirical
study addressing or particularly relevant to answering this question.
Such an inquiry lies beyond the limited aims of this Article in
introducing the basic conceptual design of the reformed process.
However, our proposal is not without significant precedent in
practice. Examples (gleaned from a limited survey) include some U.S.
and several major foreign jurisdictions that employ affirmative-
disclosure mandates more or less resembling the key facets of our
proposal. These litigation-tested systems indicate the functional utility
and operational viability of the reformed process. For illustration, we
present a sampling of these systems in groupings-first U.S., then
foreign-that reflect the relative extent to which their affirmative-
disclosure mandates displace party-directed discovery, as opposed to
court-directed discovery. 92
Remarkably, there is a federal pretrial process in actual practice
that closely resembles but was developed independently from our
proposal for mandatory, affirmative, and full disclosure: the
"Mandatory Initial Discovery" pilot projects in the U.S. District Courts
for the District of Arizona and the Northern District of Illinois.93
Launched in 2017 for a run of three years, these pilot projects were
developed and designed by the Federal Judicial Center to test the
benefits of requiring full disclosure of all relevant facts and law prior to
discovery and merits review under Rules 12 or 56.94 In particular,
unless excused by the court for privilege or another good and fully
substantiated cause, the parties must initially disclose, along with or
soon following their pleadings, all information and legal theories
regarding specified discoverable matter "relevant to the parties' claims
or defenses, whether favorable or unfavorable, and regardless of
92. The reliance by U.S. jurisdictions on party-directed discovery to offset the adversarial
slant and selectivity of the pleadings is frequently contrasted with court-directed discovery in
foreign, particularly civil law, systems. However, the divergence is not as great as commonly
believed. Federal and most other U.S. courts play an active (we dare say, inquisitorial) role, for
example in Rule 16 conferences, in motivating parties to present their respective cases more
accurately and completely. The extent to which a system employs court-directed versus party-
directed "discovery" involves a tradeoff, which we note but cannot pursue here, between the
benefits of courts devoting public funds to acquire publicly valuable information and costs of judges
becoming enmeshed in the litigation and compromising their impartiality.
93. Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project: Overview, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
content/321837/mandatory-initial-discovery-pilot-project-overview (last visited Oct. 7, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/H9WQ-HXYR].
94. These pilot projects are established by identical standing orders that expressly impose
new "discovery obligations ... supersed[ing] the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1)." See
Standing Order Regarding Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR N.
DISTRICT IIL. 1, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/_assets/_documents/MIDP%20Standing%/20
Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/28WN-RAAF].
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whether they intend to use the information in presenting their claims
or defenses." 95 Thus, the parties are instructed to disclose, among other
things, the names and contact information of everyone believed to
possess "discoverable information" and a "fair description of the nature
of the information"; everyone to whom the party has given a written or
recorded statement; a list of materials subject to Rule 34 production;
and, generally, a "state[ment of] facts relevant to [each claim or defense]
and the legal theories upon which it is based." 9 6
A close comparison of the Mandatory Initial Discovery pilot
projects and our proposal is not possible here. We note, however, the
principal difference created by eliminating Rule 12 merits review and
subjecting each pleading report directly to Rule 56 review in the
reformed process. The upshot is that the parties in our regime must
make a summary judgment-proof case on the law and evidence in their
pleading report on all elements other than those specified and
substantiated as affected by an asymmetric-information problem. The
result is not only to discipline the parties' prefiling investigations and
provide them and courts with better information to police against
abuses but also to enable resolution of more cases more quickly and
reliably on the merits. By contrast, the pilot projects' disclosure
mandates lack the focus, completeness, and substance that result from
requiring parties to muster summary judgment-proof showings at the
start of the case. The combination of notice-plausibility pleadings and
mandated initial disclosures of persons and records with potentially
relevant information will, in most cases, simply set the stage for
discovery-albeit somewhat more targeted in nature pursuant to the
court's case-management order-diluting the disciplining and
information-generating advantages of the affirmative, mandatory
disclosures. A number of potentially meritorious cases will still also be
preemptively dismissed under the Twomby-Iqbal rule.
In addition to these pilot projects, two other U.S. jurisdictions
supply precursors for the affirmative, full-disclosure mandate in our
reformed-process proposal. 97 Colorado recently adopted a mandatory-
95. Id. at 2. Parties are relieved of this requirement if the court approves their written
stipulation foregoing the option to conduct discovery in the case.
96. Id. at 5.
97. Courts have also used targeted discovery to augment the record for Rule 12 merits review.
See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., concurring). We
also note that a number of states require fact pleading to reduce reliance on full-scale discovery.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 425.10(a)(1) (West 2018) (requiring complaint to contain
"statement of the facts constituting the cause of action"); Beckler v. Hoffman, 550 So. 2d 68, 70
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting FLA. R. CIV. P. § 1.110(b) to require pleading of facts with
particularity sufficient to establish a factual basis for inferring the ultimate fact alleged); Huang
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disclosure rule designed along the lines of the prediscovery
requirements of Federal Rule 26(a)(1) that were in effect between 1992
and 2000.98 Pursuant to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), the
parties, "without awaiting a discovery request ... [and] whether or not
supportive of the disclosing party's claims or defenses," must provide
identifying, contact, and content-related information of "each individual
likely to have discoverable information" and records, documents, and
"other evidentiary material" that are "relevant to the claims and
defenses of any party."99 The avowed aim of this provision is to minimize
the use of discovery.100 The greatest displacement of discovery by
affirmative-disclosure mandate is found in the congressional design for
the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board's adjudication of "inter partes"
claims of patent invalidity. 101 To commence the pretrial process, called
a "Preliminary Proceeding," petitioners must particularize and
substantiate, with exhibits, affidavits, and expert opinions, their entire
legal and evidentiary case in chief for invalidating the patent. 102
Among foreign jurisdictions, common law systems employ the
most extensive mandates for affirmative disclosure combined with
tightly limited discovery. 103 For example, in Canada, as a rough
v. Claussen, 936 P.2d 394, 395 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (applying OR. R. Civ. P. 21 to require sufficient
factual basis for inferring the ultimate fact alleged).
98. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (noting
amendment's requirement that parties disclose identity of all persons likely to have discoverable
information relevant to the factual disputes between the parties; nature and location of potentially
relevant documents and records; calculation of damages and documents supporting it; and any
liability insurance policies), with COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring the same four types of
information).
99. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). For background on the adoption of this rule, see Richard P.
Holme, Proposed New Pretrial Rules for Civil Cases-Part I: A New Paradigm, 44 COLO. LAW. 43
(2015).
100. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 26 cmt. 17 (explaining that, in requiring that "disclosure include
information 'whether or not supportive' of the disclosing party's case, ... it is intended that
disclosures should be quite complete and that, therefore, further discovery should not be as
necessary as it has been historically").
101. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-312 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (2017).
102. Under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), the petition must show with "particularity ... the
grounds... and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge..., including[] (A)
copies of patents and printed publications ... and (B) affidavits or declarations of supporting
evidence and [expert] opinions." Once trial commences, to "continually narrow[]" its scope, the
parties are allowed to engage in "routine" and cross-examination-related discovery, including use
of depositions and other Rule 26 methods. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756,
48,761 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42); see Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v.
Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018) (sustaining the constitutionality of
assigning patent validity trials to a non-Article III court).
103. France is an outlier in general, as it relies primarily on judicial investigation to prepare
cases for trial. See OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIvii LITIGATION IN COMPARATivE CONTEXT 205-06
(1st ed. 2007).
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common denominator across its nine common law provinces, the
pretrial process mandates the parties to present a complete statement
of material facts in their pleadings and, by close of the pleading stage,
to automatically disclose all relevant documents. 104 Normally, the
availability of discovery is restricted to the post-document-disclosure
stage and to party examinations.105
The affirmative-disclosure mandate in England and Wales more
closely resembles our proposal in demanding production of all
evidence-unfavorable as well as favorable.106 Thus, prior to
commencing suit, the claimant must notify the prospective defendant
of the nature of the case, and after that, both parties must exchange the
relevant information.107 To halt the countdown on a time bar at the
outset of litigation, the complainant must provide the defendant with a
detailed "particulars of [the] claim," including a concise statement of
the facts on which the claim is based. 108 In response, the defendant must
state the factual particulars as far as they differ from the
complainant's.1 09 Further, the parties must supplement their pleadings
automatically with production of all relevant documents, including not
only those on which the party relies but also those that "adversely affect
his own case" or "support another party's case."1 10
Germany and civil law systems patterned on the German
process, like Japan's, hew to an adversarial model of the affirmative-
disclosure mandate that limits the parties' obligation to revealing
supporting information and relies on judicial inquisition to secure the
damaging matter.111 Pleadings must substantiate factual assertions
with a designation of the evidence that proves the contention, and
parties subsequently submit further legal arguments and evidentiary
matter to supplement the pleadings during this "preparatory" phase of
the litigation.1 12 Similar to our proposal for correcting information
104. LINDA S. ABRAMS & KEVIN P. McGUINNESS, CANADIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW 740 (2d ed.
2010); TODD L. ARCHIBALD ET AL., DISCOVERY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN CANADIAN COMMON
LAW 42 (2d ed. 2009).
105. Although Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction, it departs from that tradition in adopting the
other provinces' pleading requirements and, even more strikingly, follows the U.S. model of
discovery. See Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c C-25 (Can.).
106. See CPR 31.6.
107. CPR 31.16.
108. CPR 7.4; CPR 16.4.
109. CPR 16.5.
110. CPR 31.6.
111. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 422, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-zpo/englisch zpo.html#pl651
[https://perma.cc/7G2J-6RD5].
112. CHASE ET AL., supra note 103, at 222.
[Vol. 71:6:20592114
2018] PLAN TO REFORM FEDERAL PRETRIAL PROCESS 2115
asymmetries, when a party bearing the burden of a factual allegation
lacks detailed knowledge of certain relevant facts, the adversary with
such knowledge may be required to disclose the information.113 Judges,
on their own motion or upon party request, can intervene in the
preparatory phase to order production of records, appoint and elicit
opinions from experts, and direct witnesses to submit written
statements of the prospective oral testimony. 11 4 Breaking away from the
inquisitorial, civil law tradition in 1990, Italy requires pleadings to
affirmatively and fully state the specific facts at issue and legal
arguments as well as disclose all documents containing or detailed
description of the substantiating evidence-favorable or unfavorable. 115
Putting aside the shameful evidence suggesting that lawyers
will disobey the rules, the source of the strongest headwinds against
adopting the Mandatory Initial Discovery rule or some more demanding
affirmative-disclosure mandate, let alone our proposal, is the
profession's turbocharged adversarial ethos. Its postulates of zealous
advocacy spur lawyers to elevate guarding client interests above that of
everyone else, including the public generally.116 Manifestation of its
perverse influence can be seen in Justice Scalia's dissent (joined by
Justices Souter and Thomas) to the 1993 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, opposing the Court's acceptance of the short-
lived forerunner of the Mandatory Initial Discovery rule. 117 In Justice
Scalia's view, the precept of zealous representation is offended by
obligating lawyers to find and disclose "information damaging to their
clients" in service of their adversary's case. 118 This "new regime," he
concluded, "does not fit comfortably within the American judicial
113. See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STTRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 231 n.211 (2004), and
generally for incisive analysis of German civil system policy, procedures, and practice.
114. ZPO §§ 377, 404, 425. This process of judicial development of the record continues in the
trial phase, during which the court takes plenary control over examining witnesses, scrutinizing
documents, and otherwise developing the legal and evidentiary record for final judgment. Id.
§ 141-142.
115. Simona Grossi, A Comparative Analysis Between Italian Civil Proceedings and American
Civil Proceedings Before Federal Courts, 20 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213,228 & nn.51-52 (2010).
The court may also intervene pretrial to compel disclosure and conduct examination of evidence.
116. See, e.g., 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1219, at 281 (3d ed. 2004) (warning lawyers that "overpleading" legal theories
"might render the complaint vulnerable to attack by pretrial motion should it show on its face that
no claim for relief exists").
117. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 510-11 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 511.
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system, which relies on adversarial litigation to develop the facts before
a neutral decisionmaker." 119
Though pitched against expanding the required prediscovery
disclosures, Justice Scalia's argument implicated the validity of
discovery in general. Compelling lawyers to comply with a standard
discovery request, such as requiring production documents under Rule
34, can jeopardize a client's interests and advance the adversary's just
as much as producing damaging documents in compliance with the
requirements of Rule 26(a)(1). But whatever Justice Scalia's true
target, his argument fails because the presumed conflict between
adversarial litigation and discovery of damaging information is
spurious. The primary function of discovery is to promote the goal of
adversarial litigation, which, as Justice Scalia essentially recognized, is
to enable parties to develop more accurate and complete factual (and
legal) records before the court, thereby facilitating reliable decisions on
the merits. Disclosure of all relevant information, however damaging
some of it might be, is an inevitable by-product of discovery fulfilling its
central role in our judicial system. Accepting this proposition leaves
only the question whether we should continue playing the game of hide-
and-seek discovery to build pretrial records or employ the affirmative,
full-disclosure mandate to get the job done straightaway, more cheaply,
quickly, and reliably.
119. Id.
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